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Abstract 
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Foreword 
Nehal Bhuta* 
On 22 February 2013, the Global Governance Programme of the European University Institute 
convened a High-Level Policy Seminar on “Targeted Killing, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and EU 
Policy.” The seminar brought together leading experts in international human rights and humanitarian 
law, European legal advisers, European counter-terrorism officials, United Nations’ Special 
Rapporteurs, and legal advisers to non-governmental organizations, to consider the legal, ethical and 
policy dimensions of targeted killing using unmanned aerial vehicles. This policy paper collects 
extended memoranda prepared by academic participants in the seminar, and addresses in a succinct 
and policy-relevant way, the key questions discussed in the seminar. 
Between 2008 and 2012, the United States of America significantly expanded its targeted killing 
program, and has continued to conduct 4-6 strikes a month in Pakistan and Yemen in 2013. The total 
numbers of persons killed since 2001 is conservatively estimated at over 3000 (with over 400 strikes, 
mostly in Pakistan, but also in Yemen and Somalia). The United States’ government claims that these 
strikes have resulted in almost no civilian casualties, and some non-government sources argue that 
between eighty and ninety percent of these deaths were indeed “militants.”1 Other attempts to estimate 
civilian casualties from targeted killings conclude that closer to 900 civilians had been killed by late 
2012,
2
 and specific instances of civilian casualties that have been documented by journalists and 
human rights fact-finding missions,
3
 suggest that the factual basis for determining whether a particular 
individual or group of persons can be lawfully targeted, may be highly flawed. The uncertainty over 
who is targeted, why they are targeted, and the aftermath of the strikes highlights one of their many 
controversial features: the lack of transparency and accountability in the conduct of these operations, 
often in places removed from a theatre of active hostilities and against individuals who cannot be 
immediately distinguished from the civilian population. 
The practice of targeted killing poses significant challenges to the existing legal framework for the 
regulation of the use of force, both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. It’s legality within both these 
frameworks is contested, and certainly open to challenge, and the absence of reliable information 
about the legal and factual bases for the strikes makes judgements about legality even more difficult. 
At present, only the United States and Israel engage consistently in the practice of targeted killing, but 
there is an added urgency to considering the issue at the European level. European militaries have 
shown some interest in acquiring and weaponinzing drones, and their most likely theatre of 
deployment in the near future will be in so-called asymmetric and unconventional conflicts which mix 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency (or pro-insurgency) objectives – in joint operations with the 
United States (Libya), or in Security Council authorized enforcement missions (Mali). Targeted 
killings are an attractive tactic for states involved in such conflicts. 
Through a series of speeches by senior officials, the US government has maintained that its strikes 
comply with international law regulating the use of force, and the conduct of hostilities. The law and 
policy framework advanced by the United States, exposed in greatest detail in the so-called White 
Paper leaked in February 2013,
4
 is intimately connected with the claim consistently maintained by the 
                                                     
*
 Professor of Public International Law, European University Institute. 
1
 New American Foundation, “The Year of the Drone,” http://counterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.  
2
 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/ 
3
 Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and NYU Law Global Justice Clinic, Living Under 
Drones, http://livingunderdrones.org  
4
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 
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government that it is in a non-international armed conflict with what it calls “Al-Qaeda and associated 
forces.” From this proposition, a number of other propositions are advanced: 
 that a jus ad bellum right of self-defence in respect of these groups has been and continues to be 
triggered,;  
 that self-defence includes pre-emptive strikes against imminent threats of armed attack, but 
imminence does not require “clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and interests 
will take place in the immediate future,” but rather an absence of confidence that none is about 
to occur;  
 that there are no inherent geographical limitations to the conduct of strikes against these groups 
and their leaders;  
 and that planners, leaders and members of these groups remain targetable in the territory of third 
states where those states are unable or unwilling to neutralize the threat posed by these 
individuals; 
 that existing procedures for target selection and verification meet the requirements of 
international humanitarian law, including any requirements for transparency and accountability. 
Daniel Bethlehem, former Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United 
Kingdom, argues that while claims very much like these would not readily meet with agreement from 
international legal scholars, they nonetheless represent response to the “strategic and operational 
reality” which many states face, and that legal doctrine has lagged behind the practical judgments 
which states are making concerning the use of force.
5
 
Thus, what is at stake is not only the legality of a specific practice of strikes, but whether, how, and 
where to redraw the lines that circumscribe the use of force by states in conflicts with non-state actors, 
when deploying a technology that makes such strikes relatively easy. The United States has through its 
statements and justifications, sought to draw those lines in a particular way – one which challenges 
many if not most of our accepted understandings of terms such as imminence, necessity, armed 
conflict, and combatancy.  
The re-drawing of these lines implies significant choices of policy and law, and requires the active 
deliberation of all states that have an interest in such questions – and it is difficult to conceive of a 
state which would be indifferent to the legal regime governing the use of force and the conduct of 
hostilities. 
In the papers collected in this policy paper, leading scholars and policy analysts consider each of 
these propositions, and weigh the competing arguments concerning the legality of targeted killings. A 
comparative perspective from Israel is also introduced, in order to consider how Israeli court cases and 
judicial inquiries have assessed the legality of Israel’s practice of targeted killing under international 
and domestic law, and the modes of transparency and accountability which are prescribed. The policy 
paper also addresses the question of how European governments – which have been largely silent on 
the American practice – should respond, and whether European member states and the EU itself 
should consider developing a common framework for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in targeted 
killing operations.  
                                                     
5
 Daniel Bethlehem, “Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State Actors,” 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/ajil/Daniel_Bethlehem_Self_Defense_AJIL_ARTICLE.pdf  
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Extraterritorial Targeted Killings of non-State Actors by States in Response to 
Transnational non-State Violence 
 
Self-Defence, Conflict Qualification, and the Geographical Scope of Targeting Powers in 
(Transnational) Non-International Armed Conflicts  
 
Some Elements for a Possible European Policy View  
With a Brief Commentary 
Claus Kreß* 
The Elements1 
General 
(1) Under the lex lata, any targeted killing of a non-State actor by a State on foreign soil must be 
justified cumulatively under the jus contra bellum, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, under the 
law of armed conflict (to the extent applicable) as well as under international human rights law (to the 
extent not superseded or modified by the law of armed conflict). It is suggested to insist on that need 
for cumulative justification. 
Self-Defence 
(2) In the absence of consent by the territorial State, the right to self-defence is the only conceivable 
justification for a targeted killing of a transnationally violent non-State actor by the State suffering that 
transnational violence or by a State that has been requested by the victim State to come to the latter’s 
assistance. 
(3) Both under the lex lata and as a matter of legal policy the better, though still controversial, view 
is to accept the concept of a non-State armed attack within the meaning of Art. 51 UN Charter. Sound 
legal policy suggests not to dispute the resulting right to self-defence, but to insist on the spelling out 
of clear prerequisites and limitations of such right. 
                                                     
*
 Professor of Public International Law and Criminal Law, Director of the Institute of International Peace and Security 
Law, University of Cologne, Germany. As a brief policy paper, it is largely without precise references to pertinent State 
practice, jurisprudence, and scholarship. The paper essentially draws upon Claus Kreß, Some Reflections on the 
International Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15 
(2010), 245-274; id., Gewaltverbot und Selbstverteidigungsrecht nach der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen in Fällen 
staatlicher Verwicklung in Gewaltakte Privater (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995, passim), 388 pp., and on the Leiden 
Policy Recommendations on Counter-terrorism and International Law of 1 April 2010 
(http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/Leiden%20Policy%20Recommendations%201%20April%2 02010.pdf; in 
particular, paras. 38-52, 59-63) to whose formulation the author of this note has contributed (the publication of the 
accompanying book is forthcoming). Specific reference is made to the three following scholarly pieces because of their 
usefulness and very recent or forthcoming nature: Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and 
Unmanned Robots in Warfare, Study requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights, May 
2013; Marko Milanovic/Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A taxonomy of armed conflict, in: Nigel White/Christian Henderson 
(eds.), Research Handbook of International Conflict and Security Law (a pre-print is accessible at: 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=1988915); Noam Lubell/Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical 
Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 Journal of International Armed Conflict (2013), 65-88. 
1
 They may be usefully compared with Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by 
Nonstate Actors, 106 AJIL (2012), 770 (775-77) (confined to the right to self-defence). 
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(4) Though controversial, the better view is to construe the concept of a non-State armed attack so 
as to require large-scale transnational violence by a non-State organization. It is suggested that the 
term ‘large-scale’ is, in this specific context, to be construed in accordance with the intensity element 
of the concept of non-international armed conflict. Under the lex lata, there is room to argue that the 
intensity threshold may be reached through an accumulation of lower scale acts of force. Importantly, 
however, the different components of a continuous non-State armed attack must emanate from the 
same non-State organizational source and the intervals between the several lower-scale attacks must 
not be too significant. If those limits are respected, it would seem fair to take the accumulation of 
events into account in determining whether a non-State armed attack has occurred. 
(5) The right to self-defence against a non-State armed attack justifies a forcible response only on 
the territory of the State from whose territory the non-State armed attack occurs. The mere presence of 
members of the violent non-State group (including ones with a ‘continuous combat function’) on the 
territory of a third State and even isolated armed violence carried out by those members from within 
this third State do not amount to a non-State armed attack emanating from that third State and do thus 
not warrant self-defence action by the victim State on the territory of that third State. 
(6) The necessity of forcible action in self-defence, including a targeted killing, requires that the 
territorial State of the non-State actor concerned is either unwilling or unable to effectively deal with 
the non-State armed attack. 
(7) If the territorial State is not actively supporting the non-State group, at least in the form of 
‘harbouring’ the latter’s infrastructure, its responsibility for the transnational violence is weak or, in 
the case of inability, nominal at best. As a matter of general legal principles, this should influence the 
applicable proportionality standard to the benefit of the territorial State. The more the overall 
collateral damage (including, in particular, the civilian population of the territorial State) caused by the 
overall self-defence action tends to exceed the overall damage to be prevented by such action, the 
more difficult it will be to justify the targeted killing of a non-State actor as a proportionate measure of 
self-defence, if that targeted killing is likely to cause collateral damage. 
(8) Though controversial, the preferable view both as a matter of law and legal policy is that 
anticipatory self-defence is admissible. Anticipatory self-defence requires that the (non-State) armed 
attack is imminent; otherwise forcible action to avert a threat is illegal. One of the most important 
questions of the contemporaneous jus contra bellum is whether or not the temporal rigour in terms of 
immediacy implied by the diplomatic correspondence in the Caroline case can be relaxed by reference 
to the criterion of the ‘last window of opportunity’. This is doubtful under the lex lata because the 
concept of anticipatory self-defence in itself remains a controversial concept under the UN Charter, 
including the pertinent subsequent practice. In any event, the question should be approached with 
utmost care, both as a matter of law and legal policy and the criterion of ‘last window of opportunity’ 
would always have to applied with those of the immediacy and the gravity of the threat in mind. 
(9) The situation changes once a non-State armed attack has occurred (either through one single 
incident of a massive use of force such as 9/11 or after the occurrence of that instance of a low-scale 
use of force in a chain of similar events which tilts the balance towards the completion of a non-State 
armed attack; supra (4)) and there is substantial reason to believe that this armed attack will continue 
in the future, without, however, the precise date, location and and modalities of the next strike being 
known. Two approaches to the temporal scope of the right of self-defence are conceivable in such a 
situation. The first is to continue to adhere to a strike by strike-analysis, but to somewhat relax the 
standard of immediacy by reference to the criterion of ‘last window of opportunity’. This relaxation 
would appear to be justified in light of the fact that the (non-State) armed attack has already begun so 
that the next strike is not a new armed attack (and does not have to meet the quantitative threshold by 
its own). The second approach is to hold that the standard of imminence, governing anticipatory self-
defence, is no longer applicable, once an armed attack has occurred and is likely to continue. Under 
the lex lata, there is room to argue for both approaches, and the question, which approach is preferable 
Extraterritorial Targeted Killings of non-State Actors by States in Response to Transnational non-State Violence 
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as a matter of legal policy, is hard to answer, because it is not clear if and to which extent both 
approaches lead to different results in practice.  
(10) Importantly, however, also a non-State armed attack composed of a series of lower-scale acts 
of force ends, when the chain of violent events emanating from the same source and from the territory 
of the same State (supra (5)) does not continue within a reasonably short interval of time. Once the 
non-State armed attack has ended, there must be a new (imminent) non-State armed attack to trigger 
the right to (anticipatory) self-defence anew.  
Conflict Qualification 
(11) The existence of an armed conflict and in particular of a non-international armed conflict does not 
only trigger the applicability of rules which provide for humanitarian protection. More importantly in 
our context, the existence of an armed conflict also triggers the applicability of the broad targeting 
powers which exist under that body of law and which supersede the extremely stringent standards of 
international human rights law. This ‘empowering legal effect’ of the existence of an armed conflict 
explains the increasing interest of States which face the threat of transnational non-State violence to 
rely on the ‘armed conflict paradigm’. In light of the ‘empowering legal effect’ of the law of armed 
conflict, the (formerly widespread) call for broadening the scope of application of ‘international 
humanitarian law’ as much as possible is not only short-sighted, but dangerous. To the contrary, it is 
of imperative importance that the threshold for the existence of a non-international armed conflict 
remains a stringent one. 
(12) As a matter of both law and legal policy, transnational violence between a State and a non-
State actor, which meets this stringent threshold, is best qualified as a (transnational) non-
international armed conflict. The targeted killing of non-State actors, which is being carried out within 
the context of such transnational violence, is therefore governed (and should therefore be governed) by 
the law of non-international armed conflict. 
On the Geographical Scope of Targeting Powers in (Transnational) Non-International Armed 
Conflicts  
(13) A truly vexing question, both as a matter of law and as a matter of legal policy, relates to the 
scope of application ratione loci of those targeting powers which result from the existence of a 
(transnational) non-international armed conflict. The most permissive legal (policy) view is to open up 
a potentially ‘global battlefield’, on which non-State actors may be targeted to the extent that they are 
legitimate targets (due to a continuous combat function or direct participation in hostilities) in this 
particular (transnational) non-international armed conflict. Pursuant to the opposite view the State 
party to the conflict may exercise its targeting powers only on such a territory where the non-State 
party holds an organized presence and where (or from where) violence occurs which is sufficiently 
intense in and of itself to meet the threshold of non-international armed conflict. An intermediary 
position could be to allow the exercise of targeting powers outside the main ‘battlefield’ only on such 
locations, to which the non-international armed conflict has significantly spilled over, without this 
spill-over necessarily fulfilling by and of itself the threshold requirements for a non-international 
armed conflict. For example, a significant spill-over of a (transnational) non-international armed 
conflict to another State could be considered to have occurred if the key planners and/or directors of 
the non-State violence had moved to the territory of another State to plan/direct intensive violence 
from there. As a matter of law, the difficulty to specify the geographical scope of the targeting powers 
in question lies in the absence of clear treaty authority and State practice either way. This lack of 
authority does not, however, automatically lead to the most permissive legal position, as the 
recognition of a transnational non-international armed conflict already constitutes a broad 
construction of the concept of non-international armed conflict. As a matter of legal policy, the State 
interest in targeting non-State actors with an important continuous combat function also outside the 
Claus Kreß 
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‘hot battlefield’ must be balanced against the danger of a geographical expansion of the application of 
the permissive targeting rules with there significant risks for the (not directly participating) civilian 
populations concerned. In any event, the prevailing legal uncertainty regarding the existence or not of 
a limitation ratione loci of the targeting rules under the law of non-international armed conflict make it 
even more imperative to insist on the territorial limitation of the right to self-defence (as set out supra 
sub (5)), whenever the State on whose soil a targeted killing of a foreign State takes place has not 
consented to this killing. 
A Brief Commentary 
Introductory Observation 
According to request by the editors of this publication, the Elements deal with only some selected 
aspects pertaining to the question of the international legality of an extraterritorial target killing of a 
non-State actor by a State. The elements are essentially confined to (1) the legal and legal policy issues 
arising under the law of self-defence under international law, to (2) the legal and legal policy question 
as to how transnational violence between (at least) one State and (at least) one non-State group of 
persons is/should best to be qualified under the law of armed conflict, if such a qualification is at all 
approriate, and to (3) to the legal and legal policy question of the scope of application ratione loci of 
targeting powers under the law of (transnational) non-international armed conflict. It should be 
obvious that there are most important other legal components of the overall international legal 
framework governing the subject-matter such as the necessary precautions to be taken before any 
individual targeting decision and the legal consequences resulting from the principle of military 
necesity. Close attention must also be given to the ongoing debate on procedural requirements 
pertaining to the necessary substantiation of legal claims and on the need for transparency of any such 
substantiation. 
The international legality of a targeted killing of a non-State actor conducted by a State on foreign 
soil requires legal justification on two levels, which, though intimately intertwined in its application in 
practice, must be kept analytically distinct under the lex lata: the ius contra bellum, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the law of armed conflict (to the extent applicable) and international human 
rights law (to the extent not superseded or modified by the law of armd conflict). A number of recent 
informal (or leaked internal) pronouncements of representatives of the government of the USA
2
 suffer 
in clarity from not clearly distinguishing between those two levels of international legal analysis. Most 
importantly, they occasionally create the impression as if it were sufficient that targeted killings of the 
kind addressed in this note can be justified either on the level of the jus contra bellum or on the level 
of armed conflict. Yet, the lex lata requires legal justification on both levels cumulatively. I am not 
aware of a compelling policy reason to work towards a modificatuion of this overall analytical 
framework for the international legal analysis of targeted killings by States of non-State actors. 
I. Self-Defence 
The elements start from the assumption that (contrary to occasional scholarly suggestions) an 
extraterritorial targeted killing of a non-State actor by a State organ (be the latter part of the respective 
State’s military or not) invariably constitutes a use of force within the meaning of Art. 2 (4) of the UN 
                                                     
2
 For the precise references to speeches delivered by J. B. Bellinger III., H.H. Koh, J.O. Brennan, J. Johnson, E. Holder, 
and S. Preston, see Daniel Bethlehem, 106 AJIL (2012), 770 (fns. 1-6); the most recent Justice Department White Paper 
‚Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or 
An Associated Force’, see http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbe/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (last 
visited on 19.2.2013).  
Extraterritorial Targeted Killings of non-State Actors by States in Response to Transnational non-State Violence 
7 
Charter if the killing is carried out without the consent
3
 of the territorial State of the targeted person. 
The recommendations further assume that, absent a Security Council authorization under Chapter 
VII
4
, the right to self-defence is the only conceivable legal justification within our context for the 
targeted killing of allegedly violent non-State actors. In particular, this note assumes (contrary to very 
occasional suggestions by States and somewhat less occasional suggestions by scholars) that the state 
of necessity is of no avail as an independent legal justification for the unilateral extraterritorial use of 
force. 
1. The Right to Self-Defence Against a non-State Armed Attack  
According to the preferable view, the right to self-defence under the UN Charter must be directed 
against an armed attack. The undisputed case of an armed attack is that by a State. There is no doubt 
about the existence of an armed attack by a State if this State effectively controls violent human beings 
who are neither de iure or de facto organs of that State. The effective control-test is now settled case 
law of the ICJ.  
The existence of a State armed attack is subject to argument, as soon as a State’s involvement into 
transnational violence by non-State organs falls below the level of effective control. There is an 
ongoing debate (which, though not new, has been much nurtured by recent US State practice) whether 
and to what extent the term State armed attack also covers situations of such lesser State involvement. 
Arguably, the best way to legally explain such a broadening of the concept of ‚State armed attack’ 
would be by accepting the existence of a lex specialis on attribution for the purposes of the jus contra 
bellum. In light of pre- and post 9/11 practice, there is room to argue for the existence of such a lex 
specialis in a spectrum of State involvement that reaches from overall State control ‚down’ to the 
‚harbouring’ of the transnationally violent non-State organs on its soil (Afghanistan 2001 type of 
situation). It is impossible, though, to broaden the concept of State armed attack even further to cases 
of a failure of the territorial State to use the diligence due in order to prevent the transnational violence 
or of the territorial State’s inability to do so (Somalia post 1991 type of situation). In those instances, 
at least, the right to self-defence under the UN Charter depends on the recognition of the concept of a 
non State armed attack.
5
 
The idea of the right of self-defence against a non-State armed attack under the UN Charter 
remains controversial and the ICJ has yet to pronounce itself clearly on the matter. It is submitted, 
there are weighty considerations resulting both from a text-based analysis of Art. 51 of the UN Charter 
and from the analysis of State practice (not only since 2001, but) since 1945 that support the existence 
of an individual right to self-defence against a non-State armed attack. State practice in support of a 
collective right of self-defence in the case of a non-State armed conflict was long sparse, however, but 
the picture has changed as a consequence of the international reaction to 9/11. 
As a matter of legal policy, a right to self-defence against a non-State armed attack should be 
accepted. The need for doing so is most apparent in the case of a fragile territorial State which proves 
unable to prevent massive transnational violence occurring from its soil. In such a case, it would 
                                                     
3
 The requirements of a valid State consent are of signficant practical importance. They do, however, fall outside the scope 
of the elements and this short commentary. 
4
 Security Council endorsement should be seen as politically desirable, even in cases of self-defence and the role of the 
Security Council’s role in respect of the use of force agains transnationally violent non-State actors should be enhanced, 
whereever possible. This need not affect the right to self-defence. 
5
 In the case of a ‚harbouring’ State, attributability is important with respect to the question of the international 
responsibility of that State for an illegal use of force. Attributability also suggests that forcible action taken in self-
defence may, to the extend necessary, also be directed to organs and/or infrastructure of the harbouring State (for, 
example, to the Taliban in 2001/2002). Whether the right to so extend forcible action taken in self-defence depends on 
attributability, falls outside the scope of this commentary. 
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appear difficult to recommend to governments not to keep the option of defending their people by the 
use of extraterritorial force, if the necessity for doing so becomes irresistible. As a matter of 
international legal policy, the emphasis should therefore be on clearly defining the prerequisites and 
limits of the right of self-defence against a non-State armed attack, rather than categorically denying 
such a right. 
2. A non-State Armed Attack Requires Large-Scale Transnational Violence  
Irrespective of the controversial question as to whether the ICJ is correct in holding the view that a 
State armed attack requires a (largely unspecified) intensity threshold, there are weighty arguments in 
favour of requiring large-scale transnational violence in order to recognize the existence of a non-
State armed attack. First of all, State practice since 1945 in favour of a right to self-defence against 
isolated low-scale non-State transnational violence is sparce. Second, the heightened standard reflects 
the primary responsibility of the territorial State to deal with the transnational violence. Thirdly, the 
heightened standard can be seen as the articulation of an abstract proportionality requirement to the 
benefit of the territorial State whose territorial sovereignty is affected by force without this State itself 
being the attacker. For those reasons, I would be hesitant to suggest working against an intensity 
element of the concept of ‚non-State armed attack’.  
An important question of law and legal policy is where precisely to set the intensity threshold. The 
preferable view is to apply the quantitative criterion that forms part of the definition of non-
international armed conflict in order to emphasize the exceptional nature of forcible self-defence 
action against non-State actors on foreign soil. According to this view the right to self-defence against 
a non-State armed attack and the right to target individual non-State actors under the law of armed 
conflict would be triggered at the same time.  
If the more permissive approach is taken to according to which the right to self-defence against a 
non-State armed attack is triggered already at a lower level of transnational non-State violence, it is 
crucial to bear in mind that international human rights law (in additition to the jus contra bellum 
requirements set out right below) would govern the targeting of individual non-State actors. This 
drastically reduces the practical significance forcible self-defence action below the intensity threshold 
of non-international armed conflict.  
Under the lex lata there is room for the argument that, in the context of the intensity requirement of 
a non-State armed attack within the meaning of Art. 51 UN Charter, as set out above, the 
accumulation of a series of lower scale acts of force may be relevant. In the context of inter-State 
violence, the ICJ has (rather vaguely, though) indicated its readiness to take such an accumulation into 
account and States affected by series of lower-scale instances of non-State acts of force, have almost 
invariably taken such an approach. Importantly, however, the different components of a continuous 
non-State armed attack must emanate from the same non-State organizational source and the intervals 
between the several lower scale attacks must not be too significant. If those limits are respected, it 
would also seem to be fair as a matter of legal policy to take the accumulation of events into account. 
3. The Territorial Limitation of the Right to Self-Defence Against a Non-State Armed Attack  
The right to self-defence against a non-State armed attack justifies a forcible response only on the 
territory of the State from whose territory the non-State armed attack occurs. The mere presence of 
members of the violent non-State group on the territory of a third State and even isolated armed 
violence carried out by those members from within this third State do not amount to a non-State armed 
attack emanating from that third State and do thus not warrant self-defence action by the target State 
on the territory of that third State.  
This territorial distinction drawn is a necessary one in light of the fact that the exercise of the right 
of self-defence must be specifically justified vis-à-vis every State on whose territory self-defence 
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action is taken. The application of Art. 51 of the UN Charter to non-State armed attacks must not 
cloud the fact that this provision governs the legal relationship between States and must therefore in all 
cases of application retain its function to provide a justification for a use of force by a State vis-à-vis 
the State on whose territory the forcible self-defence action takes place.  
It follows that where members of a non-State armed group, which has launched an armed attack, 
are moving between more than one State territory, it may be factually tempting to speak of one non-
State armed attack that stretches over many State territories and that may eventually reach a global 
scope. From a legal perspective, however, such an automatic extension of the geographical scope of 
the right of self-defence is unwarranted. Art. 51 UN Charter justifies the exercise of forcible measures 
of self-defence against a non-State armed attack only on the territory of a State from which this non-
State armed attack (that is, large-scale violence) has emanated.  
It bears adding that this position does not introduce a hitherto unknown limitation into the 
application of the right to self-defence under international law. Quite to the contrary, a corresponding 
logic applies in the context of an armed attack by State A on State B with members of the armed 
forces of A being present on the territory of State C which is not otherwise involved in the armed 
attack by State A. State A may than consider extending its self-defence action onto the territory of 
State C. Under the existing ius contra bellum, such geographical extension of forcible action taken in 
self-defence can no longer be justified by a mere reference to the traditional law of neutrality. It rather 
presupposes that B’s conduct carried out from within the territory of C amounts in and of itself to an 
armed attack against A.  
The suggested geographical limitation ensures that the right to self-defence against non-State 
attacks will only exceptionally evolve into a right to use force on the territory of more than one State. 
To clarify that point with a view to 9/11: Assuming that the armed violence carried out by Al Qaeda 
against the US was not attributable to the State of Afghanistan, it constituted a non-State armed attack 
against the USA emanating from Afghanistan. This armed attack carried out by Al Qaeda from 
Afghanistan was likely to continue after September 11, 2001, as long as Al Qaeda preserved its quasi-
military infrastructure in that country. It did not, however, extend to Yemen in November 2002 simply 
because of the fact that members of Al Quaeda may have been present on the territory of that State at 
this moment in time, for this presence did not amount to a non-State armed attack by Al Qaeda against 
the USA emanating from Yemen. Such a limitation of the US right to self-defence appears reasonable 
in light of Yemen’s countervailing sovereignty interests. 
4. The Requirement of the Necessity of Forcible Action in Self-Defence Against a non-State Armed 
Attack (Unwillingness or Inability of the Territorial State and Absence of a Lesser Means) 
a) The extraterritorial killing in self-defence by a State of a non-State actor involved in a non-State 
armed attack against that State is not necessary where the territorial State of the non-State actor is 
willing and capable to deal with the (continuing) threat. This requirement has consistently been 
accepted by States in their pronouncements on the matter since 1945. 
b) The issue of ‘capture before killing’ is not just one of military necessity under the law of the 
conduct of hostilities in armed conflict, but it can also be raised under the jus contra bellum standard 
of necessity for self-defence action. Yet, in practice an attempt to capture will often not be as effective 
as an attempt to kill in light of the danger posed to the self-defence forces by an operation to capture 
on territory not under their control. The legal picture does not differ here from that under the law of 
armed conflict. 
5. Proportionality 
Any extraterritorial forcible action by a State carried out in self-defence must be proportional. 
Importantly, this proportionality requirement under the jus contra bellum operates on the strategic 
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level and can therefore not be applied to an invidual act of targeted killing in isolation. In addition, 
neither State practice nor legal principle supports a requirement that the intensity of the forcible self-
defence action must (more or less precisely) match that of the armed attack. Those two considerations 
may at first sight appear to suggest that proportionality under the jus contra bellum will, for all 
practical purposes, not operate as a further legal constraint against the practice of targeted killing of 
transnationally violent non-State actors. Yet, the following should be borne in mind. If the territorial 
State is not actively supporting the non-State group at least in the form of ‘harbouring’ its violent 
infrastructure, its responsibility for the transnational violence is weak or, in the case of inability, 
nominal at best. As a matter of general legal principles, this should influence the applicable 
proportionality standard to the benefit of the territorial State. 
6. The Temporal Scope of the Right to Self-Defence Against a Non-State Armed Attack 
(Anticipatory Self-Defence and the Legal Significance of an ‘Accumulation of Events’) 
The temporal scope of the right of self-defence against a non-State attack is of at least as great a 
practical importance as the geographical scope. While the matter remains controversial due to the 
formulation of (at least) the English version of Art. 51 UN Charter and while the ICJ has not yet 
pronounced itself on the matter, the preferable view both as a matter of law and legal policy is that 
anticipatory self-defence is admissible. Anticipatory self-defence requires that the (non-State) armed 
attack is imminent; otherwise the forcible action to avert a threat is illegal. 
One of the most important questions of the contemporaneous jus contra bellum is whether or not 
the stringency, which is implied in the Caroline criteria in terms of ‘immediacy’ of the future armed 
attack, may be relaxed by reference to the criterion of the ‘last window of opportunity’. This is 
doubtful under the lex lata because the concept of anticipatory self-defence in itself remains a 
controversial concept under the UN Charter, including the pertinent subsequent practice. In any event, 
the question should be approached with utmost care, both as a matter of law and legal policy and the 
criterion of ‘last window of opportunity’ would always have to applied with those of the immediacy 
and the gravity of the threat in mind. . In the context of inter-State violence, a reference to the Iranian 
nuclear crisis should suffice to demonstrate the delicacy of the matter. 
The situation changes once a non-State armed attack has occurred (either through one single 
incident of a massive use of force such as 9/11 or after the occurrence of that instance of a low-scale 
use of force in a chain of similar events which tilts the balance towards the completion of a non-State 
armed attack; supra 2. in fine) and there is substantial reason to believe that this armed attack will 
continue in the future, without, however, the precise date, location and and modalities of the next 
strike being known. Arguably, such was the case of operation Enduring Freedom. The latter use of 
force was justified not to ‘punish’ Al Qaeda (and, at the time, the harbouring Taliban regime), but as a 
measure of self-defence to prevent future attacks by Al Qaeda. There was no indication, though, of the 
precise time, the precise location or the precise modalities of Al Quaeda’s next strike against the USA, 
so that it was open to serious question whether such next strike was imminent in the rigorous sense of 
‘immediacy’ as implied by the Caroline criteria. Yet, the international community has endorsed the 
coalition’s use of force in Afghanistan on the basis of (individual and collective) self-defence. 
There are two possible ways to legally explain that endorsement. The first possibility is that State 
continued to adhere to a strike by strike-analysis, but were prepared to somewhat relax the standard of 
imminence with respect to ‘immediacy’ by reference to the criterion of ‘last window of opportunity’. 
This relaxation could be justified in light of the fact that the armed attack by Al Qaeda had already 
begun so that the next strike would not be a(n entirely) new armed attack. The second possibilty is that 
States believed that the standard of imminence was no longer applicable because Al Qaeda’s armed 
attack had begun and was likely to continue in future. Even though the USA has not made its legal 
view crystal clear in that respect, I am inclined to interpret the USA’s pronouncements on the ongoing 
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armed attack by Al Qaeda until this day in line with the second approach. Whether other States, 
including the United Kingdom, have taken the same approach, is not entirely clear to me. 
Under the lex lata, there is room to argue for both approaches, and the question, which approach is 
preferable as a matter of legal policy, is hard to answer, because it is not clear if and to which extent 
both approaches lead to different results in practice. 
Importantly, however, also a non-State armed attack composed of a series of lower-scale acts of 
force ends, when the chain of violent events emanating from the same source and from the territory of 
the same State (supra (5)) does not continue within a reasonably short interval of time. Once the non-
State armed attack has ended, there need to be a new (imminent) non-State armed attack to trigger the 
right to (anticipatory) self-defence anew. After Al Quaeda’s defeat in Afghanistan in 2002 and Al 
Quaeda’s transformation into a network of terrorist cells spread into numerous countries it has become 
harder and harder to argue that Al Qaeda’s armed attack emanating from Afghanistan on the USA is 
continuing. To the extent that Al Quaeda may have re-organized itself in Pakistan to continue violent 
action against the USA (and other countries, such as Afghanistan), this would not support an argument 
of a continuing non-State armed attack. The question would rather be whether a new non-State armed 
attack by Al Qaeda has occurred, this time from Pakistan, so that there would be justification for the 
USA to use force in self-defence on the latter State’s soil against Al Quaeda fighters and objects. I am 
not aware of any clear exposition of an argument by the USA that and how an armed attack by Al 
Qaeda against the USA emanating from Pakistan has occurred or is imminently to occur. These 
important legal distinctions can not be blurred by a vague reference to Al Qaeda’s ‘associated forces’ 
which concept the USA understands as an analogy to the concept of co-belligerent in an inter-State 
conflict scenario. If there is (no longer) an armed attack carried out by Al Quaeda, the right to self-
defence cannot be maintained by reference to the unspecified activities of unspecified ‘associated 
forces’. The USA would rather have to demonstrate that another non-State organization has begun to 
launch a non-State armed attack on the USA (or another country which has asked the USA for 
assistance) which meets all the criteria of non-State armed attack as set out above. 
II. Conflict Qualification 
At the second level of international legal analysis referred to in the introductory observation, it makes 
a fundamental difference whether the targeted killing occurs within the framework of an armed 
conflict or not. In the latter case, international human rights law fully applies and the right to life does 
not leave room for a targeted killing, except for the most exceptional circumstances. In an armed 
conflict situation, however, the targeting rules of the law of armed conflict apply and, as it is submitted 
here, supersede the otherwise applicable international human rights standards whether the armed 
conflict is of an international or non-international character. The details of those targeting rules fall 
outside the scope of the above elements and this commentary explaing those elements. The same is 
true for a comprehensive definition of the concepts “international/non-international armed conflict”.  
One point of fundamental importance, however, bears emphasizing at the outset: The fact that the 
law of armed conflict provides States with the possibility to apply much more permissive targeting 
rules compared to a situation fully governed by international human rights law explains the interest of 
States such as the USA and Israel facing (transnational) non-State violence in invoking the existence 
of an armed conflict. The resulting danger of such an interest is that the threshold armed conflict is 
incrementally lowered, a danger which tends to be concealed through the use of the partially 
euphemistic term “international humanitarian law”. This danger must be clearly kept in mind and the 
well-intended idea of giving “international humanitarian law” as broad a scope of application as 
possible is therefore to be rejected. To the contrary, there is an imperative policy need to maintain a 
stringent threshold for the application of the law of (non-international) armed conflict. 
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The following considerations assume a level of intensity of transnational armed violence between 
a(t least one) State and a(t least one) non-State organization and a level of organization of the non-
State side that meets the (stringent!) threshold of the concept of non-international armed conflict. This 
assumption allows me to focus exclusively on issues of conflict qualification. This assumption should 
not be misunderstood, however, as implying that the relevant threshold is met in any current conflict 
situation. Quite to the contrary, I am not aware of any official pronouncement of the USA which 
convincingly explains that Al Qaeda (as a transnational terrorist network) meets the required 
threshold at this moment in time. 
1. The “Non-International Armed Conflict Model” for Transnational Violence 
a) Transnational Armed Violence as an International Armed Conflict Between the Victim State and 
another State?  
Such a qualification is possible where this other State exercises effective control over the non-State 
actors and, it is submitted, also where the same State exercises overall control. If the respective State’s 
involvement is of a less intensive nature, as is most often the case in the situations of interest to this 
note, the conflict qualification in question is excluded. This is a sound result also as a matter of legal 
policy. 
b) Transnational Armed Violence as an International Armed Conflict Between the Victim State and 
the Non-State Organization (under Customary Intenational Law)?  
There have been attempts in recent US and Israeli practice to qualify transnational violence 
accordingly. The explicit argument given by the Supreme Court of Israel was that the qualification of 
the conflict as international is approriate where and because the violence exchanged by the parties 
crosses borders. It was difficult to identify an elaborate legal argument by the USA in support of the 
same position.  
Such attempts have failed. Under the lex lata, an international armed conflict presupposes a(t least 
one) State on each side of the conflict, except for the case of Art. 1 (4) AP I. The most recent State 
practice suggests that there is no significant inclination to change this legal situation and to recognize a 
new category of (asymmetric) international armed conflict under customary international law. Most 
recent statements by the USA, such as that contained in the leaked Justice Department White Paper, 
would appear to acknowledge this fact.  
This is sound also as a matter of legal policy as the idea of an asymmetric international armed 
conflict between a State and a non-State organization is fraught with conceptual and practical 
difficulties. 
c) Transnational Armed Violence as a Third and New Form of Armed Conflict (under Customary 
International Law)? 
There have been a few scholarly suggestions that there is a need to go beyond the traditional 
dichotomy of “international/non-international armed conflict” and to recognize a new form of armed 
conflict which should be tailor-made for the “new” challenge of transnational violence.  
As of yet, those suggestions have not been taken up by State practice and can therefore only be 
discussed as a matter of legal policy. It is suggested that there should be compelling need to recognize 
a new form of armed conflict and there is none because, as it will be shown infra d), the concept of 
non-international armed concept is capable of covering transnational violence and, in principle, of 
providing for reasonable legal solutions. If adjustments are needed in the light of new questions, they 
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should be made within the framework of the law of non-international armed conflict and, wherever 
possible, informally through practice and standard-setting. 
d) Transnational Armed Violence as a Non-International Armed Conflict between the Victim State and 
the Non-State Organization 
The key question is whether a non-international armed conflict can take a transnational dimension. 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convnetions allows for such a reading and the more recent State 
practice, including most notably that of the USA not clearly contradicted by other States, points in that 
direction. This is supported by two systematic considerations: first, the (partial) asymmetry 
characterizing the traditional and internal form of a non-international armed conflict also characterizes 
the transnational violence between a State and a non-State organization; second, the non-recognition 
of a transnational non-international armed conflict would result into a legal gap concerning the 
conduct of hostilities which would provoke the call for a new form of armed conflict (supra c) and 
therefore for a radical change of the existing law. For these considerations, there is a rapidly growing 
body of scholarly opinion in support of the idea that a non-international armed conflict may assume a 
transnational dimension. Importantly, however, the concept of transnational non-international armed 
conflict cannot be stretched so far as to simply add up all together any act of violence emanating from 
different groups with whatever kind of affiliation. It is therefore impossible to refer to an undefined 
concept of ‘associated non-State groups’ in order to aggregrate violent incidents, which are perpetrated 
by separate groups with no unified and organized command and control structure, in order to 
demonstrate the existence of a non-international armed conflict. 
As a matter of legal policy, it is suggested that it is sensible to recognize the possibility of a 
transnational non-international armed conflict, again bearing the need for upholding a high threshold 
in mind. 
e) An Accompanying International Armed Conflict Between the Victim State of Transnational Non-
State Violence and the Territorial State of the Non-State Organization As Soon as the Victim State 
Takes Action in Self-Defence on the Territorial State’s Soil? 
Clearly, there will be such an accompanying international armed conflict, once the victim State 
occupies part of the territory of the host State of the non-State organization or once the armed forces of 
the host State become involved into the fighting. 
It is an open question, however, whether an accompanying international armed conflict between the 
two States in question is triggered by the mere fact that the victim State of the transnational non-State 
violence acts in self-defence against the non-State actors on the territory of the host State. It is not 
clear whether the recognition of the existence of such an accompanying international armed conflict 
provides additional protection to the civilian population of the host State, which should be the key 
criterion to decide the issue.  
Importantly, the recognition of an international armed conflict does not provide a satisfactory legal 
framework to govern the conduct of hostilities between the victim State and the non-State 
organization. The international armed conflict in question can therefore only be an accompanying one 
and cannot, by its own, provide for a satisfactory legal framework which would render the recognition 
of a transnational non-international armed conflict (supra d) superfluous. 
Claus Kreß 
14 
III. The Scope of Application Ratione Loci of the Targeting Powers under the Non-
International Armed Conflict Model  
Once the possibility of a transnational non-international armed conflict is recognized, the question 
arises where precisely the State party to this armed conflict may exercise its targeting powers.
6
 It is 
suggested that this is a legal policy issue in urgent need of debate. As a matter of law, the issue is 
complicated as it is hard to disagree with the recent Justice Department White Paper in that ‘there is 
little judicial or other authoritative precedent that speaks directly to the geographic scope of non-
international armed conflict in which one of the parties is a transnational, non-state actor and where 
the principal theater of operation is not within the territory of the nation that is party to the conflict’. 
The USA takes the view that the law of (transnational) non-international armed conflict allows the 
targeting of legitimate targets (due to a continuous combat function or direct participation in 
hostilities) in this without any territorial limitation. This position has recently received powerful 
scholarly support.
7
 
There are two ways to formulate a geographical limitation on the application of the targeting 
powers, contrary to the US legal view. The first is to restrict such application to the ‘battlefield(s)’, the 
‘conflict zone(s)’, the ‘zone(s) of actual armed hostilities’ or the like even in a purely internal non-
international armed conflict, the other is to impose such a restriction with respect to any territory of a 
State other than that party to the non-international armed conflict. In an earlier piece, I have left open 
the first possibility and argued in support of the second. I have taken the view that in a transnational 
non-international armed conflict the targeting rules may be relied upon only on such a territory of a 
third State where the non-State party has established a (quasi-)military infrastructure of a kind that 
enables it to carry out intensive armed violence.
8
 The more recent scholarly debate requires a 
reconsideration of this position. This leads me to accept that State boundaries, while retaining all their 
importance at the jus contra bellum level of analysis, cannot make a decisive difference in our jus in 
bello context. (I do not think that this can be successfully challenged by drawing per analogy on the 
law of neutrality for international armed conflicts, a point which should, however, also be explored 
further.) The question can therefore only be whether the applicability ratione loci of the targeting rules 
should be generally limited to certain areas in non-international armed conflict. This view has been 
expressed, for example, by Mary Ellen O’Connell.9 The treaty law of non-international armed conflict 
does not contain an explicit rule to that effect and State practice does not present a clear picture. While 
the USA have made their conviction against any geographical constraint clear, the position of other 
States is more difficult to assess. While it cannot be disputed that the US policy of targeted killings 
outside Afghanistan has given rise to concern in many quarters of the world, it is unclear whether such 
reservations are based on the belief that the targeting rules in non-international armed conflict are 
geographically confined. Other possible explanations include a scepticism that there is or continues to 
be a non-international armed conflict between the USA and ‘Al Qaeda and its associated forces’ or a 
denial that the targeted persons are sufficiently connected with such a conflict through a continuous 
combat function or through direct participation in the hostilities at the relevant moment in time. In its 
recent decision on a US drone attack in Pakistan, Germany’s Federal Prosecutor has indicated its 
preference to limit the application of the targeting rules in a non-international armed conflict to ‘actual 
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 Note that the focus is on the targeting powers whose geographical scope of application may differ from that, say, of the 
applicable detention safeguards. It is probably too simplistic to speak of the geographical scope of a non-international 
armed conflict as such. 
7
 Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare, Study requested by 
the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights, May 2013, sub 2.2.2; Noam Lubell/Nathan Derejko, A 
Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 Journal of International Armed Conflict 
(2013), 65-88. 
8
 Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law (2010), pp. 245-274, at 266. 
9
 Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 University of Richmond Law Review (2008-2009), pp. 845-864, at 863. 
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war zones’ (‘tatsächliche Kriegsgebiete’), but the specificity of this obiter dictum10 is rather the 
exception which confirms the rule. O’Connell is therefore quite bold to claim, ‘that State practice 
shows that government officials do not recognize the rights and duties of the battlefield as extending 
far beyond it’.11 It is, however, also questionable, simply to work on the basis of a presumption against 
any geographical limitation as the USA does. Against such a presumption, it could be argued that any 
reliance of the permissive targeting rules under the law of non-international armed conflict constitutes 
an exception from the right to life as guaranteed under the peace time international human rights 
standard. Although the derogation clauses in the international human rights treaties are not technically 
applicable in our context, it may perhaps be seen as the expression of a general principle that a State 
which derogates from the peace time international human rights standard must geographically confine 
such derogation whereever the emergency so allows.
12
 The caveat ‘whereever the emergency so 
allows’ is, of course, important, and the critics of a limitation ratione loci may respond that it is 
necessary in a non-international armed conflict to target enemy fighters with a continuous combat 
function and offensive civilians whereever they are. This need not be the end of the matter, though, as 
the UN Human Rights Committee also mentions in its General Comment on Article 4 that any 
derogation is subject to the principle of proportionality.
13
 It is indeed not far-fetched to rely on that 
principle (in its broadest sense, as opposed to its more narrow law of armed conflict version) in 
support of the limitation ratione loci under consideration. The argument would be that it is excessive 
to extend the application of the permissive targeting regime under the law of non-international armed 
conflict beyond the ‘zone(s) of actual hostilities’ or the like. If one is prepared to follow this line of 
thought in principle, the question arises how to convincingly define the relevant geographical area. In 
his important recent study, Sivakumaran denies that such a possibility always exists. In line with 
modern war theorists, he points out that in some non-international armed conflicts, a traditional 
battlefield does not exist so that the search for a ‘geographic focus essentially constitutes the drawing 
of arbitrary boundaries’.14 To an extent, this is certainly true as it would indeed seem arbitrary to allow 
the leadership of a non-State party to a non-international armed conflict to immunize themselves from 
the application of the targeting rules by establishing their command centre far away from the scene of 
the actual fighting. An appropriate geographical limitation would therefore have to be formulated in 
different terms. Perhaps one could confine the targeting of persons and military objects to areas where 
the adversary has established a (quasi-) military infrastructure which significantly contributes to the 
fighting. The constraining force of such a criterion would admittedly be quite limited, though, and it 
would create new border-line issues such as the qualification as significant infrastructure or not of the 
location of a (or how many more?) drone pilots far away from any ‘battlefield’. In light of all these 
considerations, I do accept that the more recent scholarship has made a powerful case against the 
existence of a geographical limitation of the targeting rules in non-international armed conflict. This, 
of course, means that the insistence on an appropriately high intensity threshold for the acceptance of 
the existence of an armed conflict (or at least the applicability of the armed conflict paradigm of the 
conduct of hostilities) becomes even more urgent. The continuous reference in the more recent US 
statements on ‘Al Qaeda and its associated groups’ must probably seen in this context and more 
precisely as the attempt to aggregrate the violence emanating from different groups under the 
undefined label of ‘association’ for legal purposes. This attempt is without a legal basis and must 
therefore be rejected. 
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As a matter of legal policy, the key challenge is to strike the right balance between, on the one 
hand, the need for the victim State of massive transnational armed violence to defend itself also 
outside the ‘hot battlefield’ against those who are, for example, continuously planning or directing the 
activities of the non-State armed group from a more remote location and, on the other hand, the need 
to protect (not directly participating) civilian populations to become affected by the application of the 
permissive law of non-international armed conflict targeting regime. At this moment in time, I fear 
that no workable geographical standard is in sight which would mediate between the two conflicting 
considerations. States interested in establishing such a standard are well advised to introduce it into the 
international legal policy debate in light of the clear rejection by the USA of a geographical limitation 
of the application of the non-international armed conflict targeting rules and the weighty scholarly 
support that this position has recently received. 
In light of this present uncertainty, one thing bears restating: Even if a limitation ratione loci of the 
targeting rules under the law of non-international armed conflict does not exist, the territorial 
limitation of the right to self-defence (as set out supra I. 2.) remains in place, whenever the State on 
whose soil a targeted killing of a foreign State takes place has not consented to this killing. The 
targeted killing of a non-State actor on foreign State territory from which no non-State armed attack 
has occurred would then still constitute an illegal State use of force under the UN Charter, while the 
individual State organs carrying out that use of force could avoid criminal responsibility for unlawful 
killing. 
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The United States Targeted Killing Policy and the Threshold of Armed Conflict under 
International Law 
Ian Seiderman* 
The United States policy of targeted killing, including by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) 
and the corresponding legal framework adopted in the context of the US global counter-terrorism 
strategy is problematic in several respects. For one thing, the practice occurs without any real 
geographic or temporal limitations. In addition, the United States has adopted a seemingly novel 
formulation of the jus ad bellum doctrine of self-defense and its purported applicability to non-State 
actors, a justification with which the United States purports to engage the use of targeted lethal force.
1
 
In carrying out the targeted killing operations, the US appears to have killed, injured and otherwise 
adversely affected the well being of significant number of the civilian population in certain areas.
2
 
This note focuses particularly on the question as to the application of the appropriate legal regime 
that serves to protect persons from the effects of these operations. The identification of the legal 
regime, and its underlying legal standards, will determine both the normative rules constraining the 
conduct of operations and secondary rules relating to accountability and redress for victims. If the 
United States is using lethal force in furtherance of its aims in a genuine armed conflict, the rules of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) will apply, in complement with international human rights law. 
If, on the other hand, such force is used pursuant to counter-terrorism law enforcement operations, the 
rules of international human rights law, rather than IHL will place protective constraints on such 
operations.  
To address this question, it is necessary to be consider the threshold at which the conduct of a non-
state actor, including acts of terrorism and the opposing counter-terrorism operations, in this case 
targeted killings, involving the use of lethal force may be characterized as an armed conflict, as that 
term is understood under international law.  
The United States position 
The United States asserts that it is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with the non-State 
actors identified as “al-Qa’ida and associated groups” and that, pursuant to legislative statute, the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), the US President may use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those entities.
3
 The identification of “al-Qa’ida and associated groups” as the 
adversary in this putative armed conflict, is, prima facie, problematic from a legality perspective, at 
least in the absence of any meaningful clarification as to the actually identity of the “associated 
groups.” Still, as open ended as the designation seems, it has departed significantly from US assertions 
of the existence of a more generalized “war on terror” announced in the immediate afternoon of 11 
September, with President George W. Bush declaring: “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it 
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does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated.”4  
A confusion arises from the fact that the “war” against al Qaeda and associates is not the only one 
in which the US is engaged, nor, critically, is it the only one in which in which it is deploying drones 
for use in targeted killing. The US has also been engaged, together with its NATO allies and the 
recognized government of Afghanistan, in an indisputably real armed conflict against the Taliban. The 
US may well also be engaged in non-international armed conflict against other armed groups in 
support of governments, such as in respect of armed conflicts between Pakistan and armed groups 
operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
5
 The facts here are murky, obscured by the fact 
that Pakistan, at the official level has repeatedly condemned armed activities by the US on its 
territory,
6
 including through drone attacks, despite substantial evidence that at least some organs of the 
State are inviting or at least cooperating in the conduct of such operations.
7
  
Wherever the posture lies in jus ad bellum terms between the US and Pakistan in respect of the 
drone operations carried out on the territory of Pakistan, it is clear that in Afghanistan, and perhaps in 
Pakistan, the US is engaging multiple separate armed conflicts on the same territory, and that each of 
these requires a separate assessment in order to determine which legal regime must govern the conduct 
of operations. On the ground, the distinction no doubt is complicated by fact that membership of 
armed groups is difficult to determine and some may act in collusion. Amidst this confused backdrop, 
it is the identity of the purported adversaries, and not only the territorial State, that is consequential, 
indeed decisive, for making a determination as to classification of armed conflict and the designation 
of the appropriate regime is to govern operations involving the use of force.  
The fact that the US is participating in the armed conflict between the Government of Afghanistan 
and the Taliban on the territory of Afghanistan does not imply that all armed operations by the US on 
that territory are undertaken pursuant to that same conflict; some operations may be taken against al-
Qaeda and associates. The picture comes into sharper focus when considering the operations the US is 
alleged to have conducted in respect of the territories where it does not purport to be engaged in any 
hostilities aside from against al-Qaeda and associates, such as Yemen
8
 and Somalia.
9
 In respect of 
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operations to capture detainees in the rendition and secret detention programs,
10
 the reach of US 
operations has extended to a wide range of countries and drone operations may be set to expand 
further with revelations of the establishment of a new drone base in Niger.
11
 Whatever the full 
geographic extent of the targeted killings, there are more than a few instances where they have been 
carried on territory where the US is not otherwise at war. 
Although the Obama administration and its Department of Justice has declined to publicize any 
legal memoranda setting out what it considers as the legal basis for its targeting killing program, a 
summary of its position has been exposed in the Department of Justice White Paper on “Lawfulness of 
Lethal Operation against a US Citizen who is seen to be a an Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An 
Associated Force.”12 This White Paper was leaked to the US news network NBC and published on its 
website on 4 February 2013. The White Paper, however, does not contain a full analysis of the 
question as to whether engagement between the US and “al-Qa’ida or associated groups” constitutes 
an armed conflict, a question that the Obama administration, like the Bush administration, answers in 
the affirmative. The administration assumes, in the first instance, that the armed conflict arises from its 
exercise of the right of self-defense. In respect of the question of the threshold at which an engagement 
involving force rises to the level of armed conflict, the Justice Department White Paper sidesteps the 
core issue, but does say: 
“Claiming that for purposes of international law, an armed conflict generally exists only when 
there is ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups’, …some commenters have suggested that the conflict between the United States and al-
Qa’ida cannot lawfully extend to nations outside Afghanistan in which the level of hostilities is 
less intense or prolonged than in Afghanistan itself…..[] The Department has not found any 
authority for the proposition that when one of the parties to an armed conflict plans and executes 
operation from a base in a new nation, on operation to engage the enemy in that location cannot be 
part of the original armed conflict, and thus subject to the laws of war governing that conflict, 
unless the hostilities become sufficiently intense and protracted in these new locations.”
13
 
This assertion, in its framing of the question as one of geographic scope, irrespective of its merits, 
seems to beg the broader question: can the operation involving the use of force with al-Qaeda and 
associated forces constitute an armed conflict under international, notwithstanding the location of the 
theater of operations? 
The Position under International Law 
While not entirely uncontested, there is substantial authority setting out the broad parameters for 
designating forceful engagement as a non-international armed conflict. It is generally well accepted, 
including by the US, that its targeted killing operations, to the extent that they involve armed conflict, 
occur in the context of non-international armed conflict. This is so because international armed 
conflict takes place only between two States.
14
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The lowest threshold of non-international armed conflict under international law is that which is 
governed by Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, applying to “armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” It should be 
noted that there is an even higher threshold to establish the existence of non-international armed 
conflict that would trigger the protections contained Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, 
to which the US is not a party. Under terms of Article 1(1), Additional Protocol II applies to conflicts: 
“which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol.”  
The authoritative International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, by Jean Pictet, does not attempt to define precisely the threshold of Common 
article 3. It does, however, identify a number of indicators that, while not dispositive, are “useful as a 
means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and 
short-lived insurrection.”15 Among these are the degree of organization of the military force; whether 
there is an authority responsible for the acts of that force; whether the acts occur within a determinate 
territory; whether the armed group has the means of ensuring respect for the Geneva Conventions; and 
whether it acts as a de facto governing entity. 
16
 
Arguably, the most authoritative exposition as to the requisite elements of an armed conflict comes 
from the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
which has had occasion to grapple extensively with the question. In the first case decided by the 
ICTY, the Tadic case, the ICTY emphasized that a non-international armed conflict in the Common 
article 3 sense exists where “there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”17 According to the Tribunal, “[t]he rules contained in Common Article 3 focuses on 
two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. 
In an armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used solely for 
the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-
lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law.”18 In 
the Limaj case, the ICTY developed its doctrine further, noting that the objectives of an armed group 
to a conflict are irrelevant to determining the existence of an armed conflict: “The determination of the 
existence of an armed conflict is based solely on two criteria: the intensity of the conflict and 
organization of the parties, the purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of violence or also 
achieve some further objective is, therefore, irrelevant.”19 The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda has assessed the criteria in similar terms, albeit in the broader context of Protocol II. 
20
 
Does the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda meet the requisite criteria as to criteria as 
to intensity and organization? In one sense, the question is not easy to answer, because there exists no 
commonly agreed factual accounting of the purported conflict, and neither “party” is at all transparent 
about its operations. The first prong of the threshold test, in respect of the level of organization, is that 
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an armed conflict can only exist between clearly identifiable armed groups and/or State forces which 
are cohesively organized with a responsible and recognizable command structure and have the 
capacity to sustain military operations, including by use of military tactics.
21
 The very existence of al-
Qaeda as an actual organization, at least in recent years, has been called questioned. As Lubell notes: 
“[al-Qaeda’s] description ranges from being a distinct group, to a network of groups, or even a 
network of networks, and in some cases an ideology rather than an entity….[U]p until 2001 it 
appears that it could be identified as an organized group with a clear leadership and even a fixed 
location, including training camps and headquarters. The US invasion of Afghanistan precipitated 
the physical dispersal of the group and the transition towards a decentralized network of many 
groups and individuals operating on the basis of a shared ideology and, in some cases, past training 
in the Afghan camps.[...] At best, it appears that if Al-Qaeda is to be described as a distinct entity, 
perhaps the most appropriate depiction that has been offered is ‘murky’ with a loosely organized 
but highly focused network.”
22
 
The dominant view seems to be that al-Qaeda is not a transnational organization, but rather a loosely 
connected network. As one ICRC legal advisor puts it: “Basically, Al Qaeda’s way of operating 
probably excludes it from being defined as an armed group that could be classified as a party to a 
global non-international armed conflict. In accordance with the current state of intelligence, it appears, 
rather, to be a loosely connected, clandestine network of cells. These cells do not meet the 
organization criterion for the existence of a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of 
humanitarian law.”23  
Even if al-Qaeda were to possess the requisite attributes of organizational cohesion, it is doubtful 
the level of engagement with them by the US would meet the intensity prong of the test, namely, that 
to constitute an armed conflict, a situation must consist in more than sporadic incidents of violence. 
There are a number of factors that serve to indicate whether engagement between adversarial forces 
may rise to the level of armed conflict. According to the ICTY: “The criterion of protracted armed 
violence has … been interpreted in practice … as referring more to the intensity of the armed violence 
than to its duration. Trial Chambers have relied on indicative factors relevant for assessing the 
“intensity” criterion, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish that the criterion is 
satisfied. These indicative factors include the number, duration and intensity of individual 
confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of 
munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of 
casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The 
involvement of the UN Security Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict.”24  
As to the actual intensity of the engagement, outside of the operations in the real armed conflicts of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, there appears to have been not much fighting in the “war” between the US and 
al-Qaeda. The US itself evidently has not been the object of a successful international terrorist attack 
by al-Qaeda or “associates” on its territory since September 2001. With respect to attacks around the 
world, such as the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings of 2005, it is unclear whether 
a single entity can be said to be responsible. In any event, these incidents, as serious as they are, would 
have to be taken as sporadic episodes and not the type sustained pattern of assault that would 
constitute armed conflict.  
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In sum, the engagement with al-Qaeda appears to meet neither the “organization” nor the 
“intensity” criterion that would qualify it as an armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
International Human Law and International Human Rights Law 
The fact that the conflict does not appear to meet the threshold of armed conflict would suggest that, in 
principle, the appropriate legal framework is international human rights law and not international 
humanitarian law. In practical terms, if the rules governing the use of force in under either legal 
regime were to be scrupulously observed, the result would not necessarily be dissimilar, at least in 
respect of the engagement of hostilities. But there are very real differences: IHL allows the lethal 
targeting of persons based on status, rather than simply on conduct, whereas IHRL does not. There are 
a number of other distinctions concerning detention and other broader and interrelated substantive and 
procedural protections of international human rights treaties. 
Under IHL, a combatant, or a civilian taking direct part in hostilities, may be the target of lethal 
force. There are, of course, a number of rules and principles constraining the conduct of such 
operations. Most of these rules are contained in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, but the 
principal ones are also widely recognized as legally binding under customary international law, even 
in non-international armed conflict. These rules include, among others, the prohibition against direct 
attacks on civilians and civilian objects;
25
 the prohibition against indiscriminate or disproportionate 
attacks;
26
 and the requirement to take precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects.
27
 Failure to 
respect certain of these rules, such as by intentionally launching direct, indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attacks against civilians or civilian objects, constitutes a war crime, and individual 
perpetrators will incur international criminal responsibility.
28
 In principle, a State is required to 
provide for remedy and reparation for serious violations of IHL,
29
 although in actual terms access to 
such redress is seldom realized. 
Under international human rights law, no person may be lethally targeted solely on the basis of 
status. The right to life is protected under international human rights law, including under article 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the US is a party. While, as under 
IHL, the principle of proportionality must be also applied in exercising force in law enforcement 
operations, in contradistinction to IHL, the use of lethal force in such situations is prohibited save in 
exceptional circumstances. For instance, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials prohibit the use of lethal force, except “when strictly unavoidable in order 
to protect life.”30 In operational terms, this injunction means an objective of arrest/capture, rather than 
kill. When the unlawful use of force results in a death, it may constitute an extrajudicial, summary or 
                                                     
25
 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 48,51(3) and 52; ICRC, Customary International Law, Vol. I, 
Rules 1, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
26
 Additional Protocol I, Article 51(4) and (5); ICRC, Customary International Law, Rules 11-14. 
27
 Additional Protocol I, Article 57; ICRC Customary International Law, Rules 15-21.  
28
 ICRC Customary International Law, Rules 168-170; Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(b).  
29
 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the UN General 
Assembly (Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005); ICRC Customary International Law, Rule 150. 
30
 Principle 9, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990). For a fuller treatment of the standards in this respect, see the Report to the 
UN General Assembly of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, UN 
Doc. A/61/311 (5 September 2006), paras. 33-45. 
The United States Targeted Killing Policy and the Threshold of Armed Conflict under International Law 
23 
arbitrary killing and incur the criminal responsibility of those carrying out.
31
 Victims of such unlawful 
killings have the right to remedy and reparation.
32
 The question as to whether the protections of the 
ICCPR, as a jurisdictional matter, extend extraterritorially to all of the targeted killings is not clear,
33
 
but the European Court of Human Rights has recently extended such protections in respect of a range 
of extrajudicial killings by United Kingdom in Iraq.
34
 
It should be noted, while law enforcement/international human rights law must be considered the 
appropriate legal regime in respect of the conflict between the US and al-Qaeda, even under IHL, 
human rights law would not become entirely inoperative. While the question of the complimentary 
relationship between the two regimes remains in some respects contested and not in any respect the 
principal focus of this discourse, the essential protections of human rights law do not cease in time of 
armed conflict, as the International Court of Justice has repeatedly affirmed.
35
 According to the UN 
Human Rights Committee, “[T]he [ICCPR] applies also in situations of armed conflict of which the 
rules of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, 
more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be especially relevant for the purposes of 
the interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually 
exclusive.”36 Critically, a number of human rights bodies, including the Human Rights Committee and 
the European Court of Human Rights have found violations of right to life protections in respect of 
lethal operations undertaken in non-international armed conflict.
37
  
Policy considerations militate against changing the legal paradigm 
The US, in its characterization of its operations against al-Qaeda and associated groups, appears to 
have stretched the concept of armed conflict well beyond its meaning under international law. Other 
States so far have not followed suit, declining to situate their counter terrorism efforts within the war 
paradigm. It is instructive in this respect that in the wake of various terrorism attacks around the world 
in aftermath of the 11 September, such as the bombings in 2004 in, in 2005 in London, and in 2005 in 
Bali, the governments of the UK, Spain and Indonesia respectively did not adopt the war-grounded 
approach United States was implementing. Nor, it would appear, has any other State.  
Following the London attacks, Sir Ken MacDonald, the then UK Director of Public Prosecutions 
addressed the question in a statement in forceful terms: “London is not a battlefield. Those innocents 
who were murdered on July 7 2005 were not victims of war […]. The fight against terrorism on the 
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streets of Britain is not a war. It is the prevention of crime, the enforcement of our laws and the 
winning of justice for those damaged by their infringement.”38 
The overreaching security-oriented approaches adopted by many to confronting terrorism in the 
post-11 September 2001 period have already done immense damage to fabric of the rule of law around 
the world.
39
 The responses have eroded the efficacy of core principles of human rights law and the 
administration of justice. If States were more generally to accept the elastic war paradigm conceived 
and adapted by the US to its counter-terrorism efforts, the harm could be exponentially greater. A 
great many States face challenges of some kind relating to terrorism. If these States were to shift from 
a law enforcement approach, and instead treat their operations to confront violent threats as global 
wars, the result would likely be increased international lawlessness, not to mention dire humanitarian 
consequences, with States arrogating to themselves the right to target those it designates as combatants 
or persons directly participating in hostilities, wherever they may be situated. The threat is even 
starker when one considers that for some States the primary sources of violence may types of 
organized crime other than terrorism, and in some of these instances armed groups may have effective 
control the streets of city areas. There would be no principled reason why the war paradigm could not 
be extended to these other threats of organized violence, beyond terrorism. 
The invocations and application of the war paradigm has also facilitated many of the numerous 
abuses and lack of accountability that have hung a dark shadow on US counterterrorism efforts, 
particularly in the post 11-September 2001 context. According to the International Commission of 
Jurists’ Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights:  
The US stance has caused serious damage to the protections accorded by both international human 
rights and humanitarian law. The war paradigm has given rise to several problems: there is inter 
alia the false implication that one of the parties to a conflict can invoke the rights and privileges of 
warfare without affording reciprocal rights to its enemies or accepting the corresponding legal 
constraints, and the mistaken claim that this can place individuals in a “legal black hole”.
40
  
States can avoid these threats by firmly situated their counter-terrorism measures in the framework of 
criminal law enforcement, using police intelligence gathering and international cooperation, and 
subjecting their conduct to the modest and appropriate constraints of human rights law. Lethal force, 
in this framework, will only be available when strictly necessary to protect life. That limitation does 
not wholly preclude the use of drones, which are only an instrumentality, but it would likely restrict 
the scope and extent of their use. While this kind of limitation places greater constraints on targeting, 
it will no doubt greater protect “civilians” from the devastating effects of drones. Recourse to the 
criminal justice system will also create an incentive to arrest terrorist suspects, and bring them to 
justice through fair trials, which is the only means of providing genuine accountability for terrorist 
activities. This approach allows for more effective redress for victims of both terrorism and counter-
terrorism abuses.
41
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Taking a holistic view of the use of drones and the right to life 
Christof Heyns* 
Introduction1 
It is often said that a central preoccupation of law is to ensure that the use of force is a matter of last 
resort. However, this leaves open the question of what can serve as a good reason for such an eventual 
step, especially where the use of lethal force is at stake. International law largely proceeds from the 
premise, or poses the ideal, that a resort to the use of such force is justified only where there is no 
other way to prevent the person against whom it is directed from taking life. Deterrence, retribution, 
the imposition of a certain world-view; none of these reasons will suffice. The onus is on those who 
use force to show that it is justified.  
Adherence to what is sometimes described as the protection of life principle is required by 
international human rights law which sets the default standards. International law recognises the 
realities of armed conflict, which is in itself only justifiable as a measure of necessity and last resort. 
Parties are allowed to engage in actions aimed at subduing each other, but this is not without limits; 
the protection of life remains the ideal. In some cases lower levels of protection are provided to life 
when an armed conflict occurs, but international law allows this only as a closely guarded and limited 
exception, and has developed stringent rules to contain the level and targets of the force that may be 
used.  
Importantly, law forms just one part of a larger and interconnected set of constrains that serve, with 
varying degrees of success, to contain the use of force in general and to ensure that it is not targeted 
against innocent bystanders. When the extra-legal constraints are diminished, the legal constraints are 
bound to come under increased pressure, and their role in protecting life is increasingly important. 
One such extra-legal constraint on the use of force is physical distance, which often serves to keep 
enemies apart. National and other borders can contribute towards preventing physical confrontation, at 
least until a certain collective limit is reached. Potential psychological constraints include the 
realisation that engagement in violence may place oneself or those close to one at risk, or that it may 
lead to the distress caused by the act of killing another human being. A further restraining influence is 
that political leaders may have to persuade their populations and their soldiers to cooperate and to be 
willing to face the hardships of war before they are willing to commit to it.  
Normative systems other than law, such as religion and ethics, often place a high value on life 
and strive to confine its deprivation, although they can also be used as a justification for the 
opposite.  
Acting in concert, constraints such as those listed above can contribute towards diminishing and 
guiding violence, and a weakening of one component can undermine the ability of the system of 
constraints as a whole to achieve this goal.  
In view of the above it seems important to approach the introduction of new weapons systems in a 
holistic manner when considering their impact on the right to life. Questions should be asked whether, 
in view of the totality of potential constraints, such systems are likely to diminish or increase the pro 
rata number of people killed, and whether or not they will contribute towards directing such violence 
towards the perpetrators of aggression. 
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It is clear that the world is moving towards an increased reliance by states on remote controlled 
weapon delivery systems, and in particular armed drones (here called drones). The question becomes, 
in a scenario in which states with varying records of adherence to humanitarian standards are able to 
use drones, what affect such a diverse pool of users (leaving aside the question of non-state actors 
acquiring drones) will have on the number of people killed, and the precision of targeting 
It has been argued that the unique feature of drones is that they make the long-distance precision 
deployment of lethal force much easier than before. Drones, in particular, facilitate the identification 
of potential targets in distant locations, and reduce the period between such identification and the 
deployment of kinetic force against the targets. 
A number of the extra-legal constraints on the use of force listed above may be affected and indeed 
weakened by the use of drones. The restraining influence of physical distance is obviated in the case of 
drones by the combination of information, navigation and aviation technology that allows someone 
from halfway around the world to “come close from a distance”. It is possible, at least in some cases, 
that this distance may diminish some of the psychological barriers to killing by the individual 
operators, to whom pressing a button to deploy lethal force may resemble a computer game.  
Crossing international borders with a drone could be seen as less intrusive by the different parties 
involved, compared to doing the same with a piloted aeroplane, not least because drones also have a 
well-recognised reconnaissance function. Moreover, using drones does not pose the potential 
embarrassment to the state using it of having a captured pilot, shot down behind enemy lines or being 
placed on display to the world. 
Because of its lower human and possibly other costs for the side that uses drones, the political and 
other social constraints on leaders wishing to use force in another state may as a result be weakened. 
Compared to mobilising the necessary support for a boots on the ground campaign, with all its 
potential fall-outs, deploying a drone attack or a series of such attacks is straightforward.  
If some of these standard thresholds on the use of force are lowered, states may resort more easily 
to deploying force in other countries. This may weaken the international security system, which 
depends on a certain respect for the sanctity of international borders. The number of people killed in 
all the ensuing encounters seen cumulatively may increase, even if each individual engagement is 
more targeted. In short, the temptation will be to use force even if it is not in fact a matter of last 
resort. Meanwhile, the question as to what extent drones will indeed, in the long run, lead to better 
distinction between permissible and impermissible targets, if used on a global scale, has not yet been 
settled. 
Given the fears about their security by states with access to advanced technology, including 
technology that makes such treats more visible than before, and the relative ease of using drones, it is 
understandable that there will be pressure on the legal constraints on such usage. However, lowering 
the legal constraints on the cross-border use of force seems to be potentially risky whatever weapons 
systems are being used, especially if precedents for an expanding number of states are created. To do 
so in order to accommodate drone attacks may pose specific additional risks. As was pointed out 
above, many of the extra-legal limitations on the use of force may not be in place in the case of drones, 
or have less force than would otherwise be the case. Giving wide latitude to states around the world to 
use drones, even if the immediate intention is to protect life and to pursue safety poses a real risk of 
making the world a more unsafe place in the long run.  
It is worth considering some of the current attempts to create a more permissive legal framework 
for the use of drones against the backdrop of the full set of constraints that the international legal order 
has over the years developed to control and direct the use of lethal force. 
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Protecting territory and life: International legal constraints on the use of inter-state 
force  
A number of legal regimes – the law on the inter-state use of force, international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, supported by international criminal law – in addition to domestic law 
contribute towards maintaining the international security system and supporting the protection of the 
right to life.  
An important component of controlling the geographical spread of the use of force is the protection 
of state sovereignty (ironically, in other contexts often one of the barriers to the application of 
international human rights norms). The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force in the 
territory of another state, subject to limited exceptions.  
One state may use force on the territory of another state that consents to such actions. Consent by a 
state to the use of force on its territory cannot be presumed and must be provided by the highest 
authority in the state. Once consent is withdrawn, the use of further force is prohibited. States cannot 
consent to the violation of human rights or of humanitarian law on their territory. To claim that a state 
has granted consent when the criteria for consent have not been met is one way of lowering the 
constraints on the use of force. 
Moreover, article 51 of the UN Charter allows states to use force on the territory of another state in 
self-defence when they are attacked. This clearly allows for self-defence where an attack has already 
started, but it has also been interpreted – not without controversy - to allow for anticipatory self-
defence. This can however only be done where the necessity of the self-defence is “instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation”. The attack must thus be 
imminent. A further way of circumventing the international restrictions on the use of force is to stretch 
the requirement of imminence, and to conduct pre-emptive strikes, aimed not at countering an existing 
threat but to prevent a future threat from arising.  
Moreover, the right of self-defence persists only for so long as it is necessary to halt or repel the 
armed attack in question. It to be questioned whether the events of 11 September 2001still justify a 
claim of on-going self-defence more than a decade later. 
Traditionally self-defence was considered to be possible only against an attack by another state. 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the events of 9/11, it is a widely held, though not universally endorsed 
view, that force may be used on the territory of another state if it is necessary in response to an armed 
attack by a non-state actor from such territory, where that state is unwilling or unable to act against the 
non-state actor. However, to ensure that this wider authorisation of the use of force is not invoked too 
readily, it makes sense to require – as some commentators argue - that the level of violence of the 
attack necessary to justify a resort to self-defence against a non-state actor will be higher than if the 
attack came from another state.  
Measures adopted by states in the exercise of self-defence must, in terms of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, be reported to the Security Council. The rationale of this requirement is to ensure 
transparency as to the basis of the claim that self-defence was necessary, and to put the issue 
formally on the agenda of the Security Council. As a result it seems reasonable to require a 
state to report afresh to the Security Council every time that the material facts change – for 
example, where self-defence is used as a basis for armed intervention on the territory of a new 
state or new parties are added to the conflict. Not to do so may weaken the international 
constraints on the use of force. 
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Protecting the right to life: International human rights law and international 
humanitarian law 
In addition to protecting the territorial integrity of states, international law also provides direct 
protection to the lives of individuals. Securing the right to life is widely regarded as a rule of 
customary international law, a general principle of international law and some see it as a rule of jus 
cogens. In addition, it enjoys wide treaty protection at the global as well as at regional levels.  
International human rights law is binding on all states and provides the default protection of 
the right to life. The right to life proscribes the “arbitrary depravation” of life. Under human 
rights law, lethal force may be used only if such force is necessary (there is no other way to 
stop the aggressor) and proportionate (the aggressor is killed in order to save the life of 
someone else).  
States are bound by the right to life also when they act outside their own territory. One way to 
lower the constraints placed by international law on the use of force by states is to deny extraterritorial 
application of human rights. This position is however not tenable because of the status of the right to 
life as a rule of customary international law and a general principle of international law. Moreover, 
there are extensive precedents to the effect that treaty provisions on the right to life may also bind state 
parties over territory other than its own where a state exercises effective control over such territory, or 
has an individual in custody. In the case of drone strikes, however, the targeted persons are not in 
custody. Nevertheless, there is some case law supporting the proposition that targeting a particular 
individual with lethal force under such circumstances constitutes an act of ultimate control over that 
person, resulting in such action being covered by that state’s treaty obligations to respect the right to 
life (in addition to its obligations under custom and the general principles of international law). 
Where states use force in those exceptional situations that qualify as an “armed conflicts”, 
international humanitarian law (IHL) applies in addition to human rights law. Drones are 
currently not used in international armed conflict between states, so the question whether IHL 
also applies in the case of a particular drone strike depends on whether it occurs in the context 
of a non-international (in the sense of non-interstate) armed conflict, in this case between a 
state and an organised armed group. The threshold requirements for a non-international armed 
conflict (NIAC) to exist concern the intensity of the violence and the level of organisation of 
the armed group.  
Where these thresholds are not met, and there is no armed conflict, only human rights law applies. 
Where there is an armed conflict, the human rights standards continue to apply but the question on 
whether a particular deprivation of life is to be considered “arbitrary” is determined with reference to 
the norms set by IHL.  
IHL rules such as humanity, pre-caution, and necessity are part of customary international law and 
can play an important role in protecting life. The principle of humanity provides that humanity must 
guide all the actions of belligerencies; pre-caution demands that parties to a conflict take utmost care 
when targeting and avoid arbitrary taking of lives; and the principle of necessity obliges parties to a 
conflict to use only such force as is necessary in achieving the military goal or advantage. 
The rule of distinction provides that only belligerents may be directly targeted, not civilians who 
are not involved in hostilities. In the case of a NIAC, the organised armed groups involved typically 
do not have regular armed forces as identifiable as those of states. Civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities (DPH) may be targeted, as well as (according to the view of the ICRC and others) members 
of armed groups with a continuous combat function (CCF), defined as “individuals whose continuous 
combat function is to take a direct part in hostilities”. Vague or permissive interpretations of these 
criteria – for example to regard all military aged men in an area of hostilities as legitimate targets – 
can be used to legitimise uses of force that are not in conformity with the requirements of IHL, and 
reduce constraints on the use of force. If there is uncertainty, civilian status must be presumed. 
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The rule of proportionality for its part requires that any incidental death of non-belligerents or 
collateral damage should not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. Not only 
should the actual incidental deaths be brought into the calculation, but the entire process of disruption 
of the society must be measured against the anticipated military advantage. Especially where drone 
warfare is extended over a long period, such disruption of social life and the exercise of rights such as 
the right to education can accumulate considerable weight.  
So-called “signature strikes” occur where people whose identities are not known are targeted, based 
for example on their location or appearance. If they meet the requirements of DPH or CCF set out 
above they may be targeted, but not otherwise.  
If one strike is followed up by another in a short space of time in order to target those who provide 
assistance but are not legitimate targets, it will be a war crime. However, those who are DPH or CCF 
may be targeted in that way, provided the other IHL requirements, such as proportionality (previously 
legitimate targets who may have been rendered hors de combat by the first strike should now be 
counted along with the civilians), are met. 
An armed conflict exists between different parties. Claims that “co-belligerents” or “associated 
forces” may also be targeted reflect a reliance on a concept from inter-national armed conflict that 
does not apply in the context of a NIAC and that could lead to an expansion of targeting authority 
without clear limits.  
The case for a transnational armed conflict – where those with a nexus to the same organised group 
are found in various states, and the violence they use can be added together to meet the threshold 
requirement of an armed conflict – could rest on firmer theoretical ground. However, it is debatable 
whether such armed conflicts in fact occur in practice, and whether a case by case approach to the 
classification of armed conflicts should not be followed. 
The principles of humanity and necessity referred to above have triggered considerable debate 
about the question whether there is a legal obligation to capture rather than kill an adversary where 
this is possible during an armed conflict. There is some state practice to support posing such a 
requirement, but it is too early to say which way the debate will go.  
It is clear from the above that IHL places fewer constraints on the use of force than human rights 
law. One of the pervasive ways in which greater authority to use lethal force is legitimised, is therefore 
to claim that situations that do not meet the threshold requirements for such status as “armed conflict” 
and hence that the more permissive IHL norms apply. This is a trend that should be resisted. Many of 
the usages of drones outside established conflict areas should be evaluated according to the more 
stringent standards of human rights law. 
Moreover, a conflation between the different legal regimes and the requirements they pose may 
make it easier to resort to the use of force. Even if the requirements for a justification of the use of 
force in self-defence and imminence under the principles relevant to the inter-state use of force are 
met, this does not answer the question whether the requirements of self-defence and imminence under 
human rights law have been met. These are two separate questions that should be answered 
consecutively and the two tests should not be collapsed. Once the question whether inter-state force 
may be used has been answered, the question about the right to life needs to be addressed. If there is 
indeed an armed conflict, imminence is not required. Recent statements that threat assessments are 
made before particular individuals are targeted with drones in situations of armed conflict are to be 
welcomed as an exercise of heightened protection of life; however, if the violence does not in fact take 
place in the context of armed conflict, the net result is likely to be a lower level of protection. 
The right to life has two components: the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life, as well as 
accountability should it occur. In order to achieve both, transparency is a crucial requirement.  
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Conclusion 
The international legal framework does not provide a basis to hold that drones are illegal weapons, but 
to the extent that the use of drones is not restricted by the same extra-legal constraints as other 
weapons delivery systems, they should be treated with special caution – especially when the possible 
lowering of legal restrictions on their use is at stake. The existing international standards should be 
maintained and applied with rigour, to ensure the proper long-term protection of the right to life.  
The notion of time plays a central role in what was said above. Lethal force should be used 
only as a measure of last resort. It can also be used only in defence against an imminent 
threat. A last dimension of time should be emphasised in conclusion. Commentators have 
emphasised the need for the use of armed force to be limited in duration. Every war must 
come to an end. War is the exception; peace is the norm. 
War, thus conceived, for all its destructiveness at least holds out the promise of peace at some point 
in the future. The long-distance lethal targeting abilities that drones offer to an increasing number of 
states around the world, raise the prospect that in future cycles of war and peace will be replaced by 
low-intensity but drawn-out applications of the use of force that know few geographical or temporal 
boundaries, and offer no prospect of healing and recovery. 
In order to ensure the protection of life, the legal constraints on the use of force should be 
maintained and protected against expansive interpretations. New law is not required to limit the use of 
force through drones, but the existing legal standards should not be lowered. 
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Drone Attacks and the Law of Targeting 
Nils Melzer* 
States resorting to drone attacks usually argue that the targeted individuals are legitimate military 
targets and, thereby, seek justification in international legal standards designed to govern the use of 
means and methods of warfare to attack legitimate military targets – the “law of targeting”. The law of 
targeting is derived primarily from international humanitarian law but, to a certain extent, may also be 
complemented by applicable human rights law. The most important prerequisite for the applicability 
of the law of targeting is the existence of an armed conflict. But even in armed conflict not every use 
of force is necessarily part of the hostilities. As far as drone attacks are concerned, the law of targeting 
determines whether the targeted individual is a legitimate military target and, if so, provides the legal 
standards governing attacks directed against that individual. If the targeted individual fails to qualify 
as a legitimate military target any direct attack would have to comply with law enforcement standards.  
1. The Principle of Distinction  
The law of targeting that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives”, whereas “(t)he civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack”.1 Consequently, if armed drones are to be 
used as a means of warfare, they must be capable of distinguishing between members of armed forces 
and organized armed groups (who may be legitimately targeted) and the peaceful civilian population 
(which enjoys protection against direct attack).  
A key notion for the distinction between legitimate military targets and protected persons is the 
notion of “direct participation in hostilities”. While combatants of State armed forces are those 
individuals who “have the right to participate directly in hostilities”,2 irregularly constituted organized 
armed groups “consist only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in 
hostilities ("continuous combat function")”.3 Moreover, exceptionally, even civilians may become 
legitimate military targets, namely when they lose their protection “for such time as they directly 
participate in hostilities”.4 Thus, a clear and coherent interpretation of the notion of direct participation 
in hostilities is of central importance to the implementation of the principle of distinction. 
In essence, the notion of direct participation in hostilities comprises two basic components; that of 
"hostilities" and that of "direct participation" therein. While the concept of "hostilities" refers to the 
collective resort by parties to an armed conflict to means and methods of warfare, "participation" in 
hostilities refers to the individual involvement of a person in these hostilities. Depending on the 
quality and degree of such involvement, individual participation in hostilities may be described as 
"direct" or "indirect". While direct participation refers to specific hostile acts carried out as part of the 
conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict and leads to loss of protection against direct 
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attack, indirect participation may contribute to the general war effort, but does not directly harm the 
enemy and, therefore, does not entail loss of protection against direct attacks. 
According to the ICRC's authoritative Interpretive Guidance,
5
 the notion of direct participation in 
hostilities should be interpreted as referring to specific acts, which are designed to support a 
belligerent party by directly harming its enemy, either by directly causing military harm or, 
alternatively, by directly inflicting death, injury or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack. In other words, in order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specific act must 
meet three cumulative requirements: First, the harm likely to result from the act must reach a certain 
threshold (threshold of harm). Second, there must be a direct causal relation between the act and the 
expected harm (direct causation). Third, there must be close relation between the act and the 
hostilities occurring between parties to an armed conflict (belligerent nexus).  
In practice, the determination of whether a targeted person represents a legitimate military target 
can be extremely difficult, particularly in asymmetric confrontations with organized armed groups that 
are deliberately intermingling with the civilian population and show no consideration whatsoever for 
the resulting risk of erroneous attacks against peaceful civilians. Depending on the cultural and 
political context, there may be various degrees of voluntary or involuntary support or affiliation with 
such groups that do not necessarily amount to direct participation in hostilities and, therefore, do not 
entail loss of civilian protection against direct attack. Also, in many contexts, informants, 
collaborators, factions and gangs are likely to provide false intelligence to armed forces in the hope for 
an attack against a rival group or individual.  
The enormous difficulties associated with implementing the principle of distinction in such 
contexts may provoke ill-considered simplifications, such as the reported US policy of “signature 
strikes”, which seems to authorize drone attacks against unidentified individuals who, based on their 
personal behaviour, contacts or other characteristics are suspected of being “terrorists”, “militants”, or 
“jihadists” – legally undefined notions which are strictly irrelevant for lawful targeting.6 Such policies 
not only undermine the fundamental distinctions underlying the law of targeting, but also fall 
dramatically short of the precautions and presumptions which must be applied in situations of doubt. 
2. The Principle of Precaution 
In implementing the principle of distinction, those responsible for planning and conducting an attack 
must take all feasible precautions to avoid erroneous targeting and the infliction of incidental civilian 
harm (“collateral damage”). They must also do everything feasible to assess whether the envisaged 
attack may be expected to cause incidental civilian harm which would be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage and, if so, refrain from conducting such an attack.
7
 In practice, the 
extent to which precautions in attack are “feasible” depends on factors such as the availability of 
intelligence on the target and its surroundings, the level of control exercised over the territory, the 
choice and sophistication of available weapons, the urgency of the attack and the security risks which 
additional precautionary measures may entail for the attacking forces or the civilian population.
8
 When 
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all feasible precautionary measures have been taken and doubt persists as to the status or activities of 
the targeted persons or of bystanders, they must be presumed to be protected against direct attack.
9
 
Decisions to carry out a drone attack are not typically taken under the time pressure and personal 
stress of immediate combat operations, but targeted individuals are often tracked for several days or 
weeks before being attacked. In many circumstances, the long loiter capacity of drone may 
significantly extend the period at the disposal of operators to verify targets, assess the likelihood of 
collateral harm and clarify other factors before taking the decision to attack. As a general rule, the 
context of targeted killing through drone-attacks allows - and therefore also requires - a particularly 
high level of precaution. 
Of course, the often difficult circumstances of armed conflict also require a degree of tolerance for 
errors made “within the limits of honest judgment on the basis of the conditions prevailing at the 
time”.10 In no case, however, does the law of targeting permit the targeting of individuals based on the 
mere suspicion that they may qualify as a legitimate military target, such as appears to be the case with 
the current US policy of “signature strikes”. The distinctive criterion between “mere suspicion” and 
erroneous “honest judgment” is not only the degree of subjective conviction or doubt held by the 
responsible State agent, but also the objective reasonableness of that subjective conviction in view of 
the circumstances prevailing at the time. 
3. The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality in the conduct of hostilities prohibits attacks against legitimate 
military targets if the incidental harm expected to be inflicted on protected persons and objects 
(“collateral damage”) would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
expected to result from the attack.
11
 
Although drone attacks are often portrayed as a method of “surgical” warfare, it is probably more 
realistic to assume that they are neither inherently disproportionate nor inherently proportionate and 
that, instead, a separate assessment must be made for each operation. Various statistics show that, in 
practice, drone attacks regularly result in incidental civilian death, injury and destruction. In contrast, 
the CIA seems to be convinced that, since May 2010, drone strikes have not caused any incidental 
civilian harm whatsoever.
12
  
This conclusion more likely reflects flawed assessment criteria than factual reality. More precisely, 
the current US administration seems to have introduced a method for counting civilian casualties 
which automatically presumes that all males of fighting age present in the area of a planned attack are 
combatants, unless intelligence collected after the attack proves otherwise.
13
 Clearly, this deplorable 
approach not only employs inadmissible criteria for the distinction between civilians and combatants, 
but also circumvents the precautions and presumptions to be applied in situations of doubt and, 
thereby, effectively removes all meaningful safeguards provided by humanitarian law against the 
infliction of excessive incidental harm on the civilian population.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
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4. The Prohibition of Denial of Quarter 
The purpose of military hostilities in warfare is not to kill combatants, but to defeat the enemy, even if 
this requires the killing of combatants. It is therefore prohibited to order that there shall be “no 
survivors” or to conduct hostilities on that basis, to refuse to accept an enemy’s surrender or to attack 
those who are hors de combat due to wounds, sickness, capture, surrender or any other reason.
14
 
Whether or not the circumstances permit the capture and evacuation of adversaries who are hors de 
combat is immaterial.  
It is characteristic for current drone policies that they aim specifically at the killing of the targeted 
persons. Unable to capture wounded or surrendering enemies, armed drones are reported to routinely 
carry out follow-up strikes on wounded survivors of first attacks, killing not only the intended targets, 
but also first responders and humanitarian personnel attempting to rescue the injured.
15
 The law is 
absolutely clear in this respect: persons hors de combat are no longer legitimate military targets, 
regardless of whether or not they can be captured.
16
 Medical personnel and others trying to collect the 
dead and care for the wounded must be respected and protected.
17
 Directing attacks against persons 
hors de combat,
18
 or against non-combatants engaged in their rescue,
19
 constitutes a war crime in any 
armed conflict. As a matter of law, ordering a targeted killing without permitting the option of 
suspending the attack when the targeted person falls hors de combat is unlawful and, under the ICC-
Statute, amounts to a war crime in international armed conflict.
20
 In sum, it is always prohibited to 
declare that the adversary is outside the law, and to treat him as such on the battlefield.
21
 
5. The Principles of Military Necessity and Humanity  
In regulating the use of force against legitimate military targets, humanitarian law neither provides an 
express "right to kill", nor does it impose a general obligation to "capture rather than kill". Instead, 
humanitarian law simply refrains from providing certain categories of persons with protection against 
attacks, that is to say, against “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in 
defence”.22 The fact alone that a person is not protected against acts of violence, however, is not 
equivalent to a legal entitlement of the adversary to kill that person without any further considerations. 
Rather, even in attacks against legitimate military targets, elementary considerations of humanity 
require that no more death, injury or destruction be caused than is actually necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate purpose.
23
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In practice, the kind and degree of force to be used against legitimate military targets obviously 
cannot be pre-determined for all conceivable military operations, but must be determined by the 
operating forces based on the totality of the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time and place. As 
a general rule, circumstances which would allow an attempt at capture or the issuing of a warning 
prior to the use of lethal force are more likely to arise in territory over which the operating forces 
exercise effective control. In the contexts in which armed drone attacks are currently carried out, the 
restrictive aspect of military necessity is unlikely to play a major role, because any attempt at 
capturing the targeted person would almost certainly involve significant risks for the operating forces 
and, therefore, would not be required. On the other hand, the fact alone that a capture operation would 
be impossible or fraught with unacceptable risk does not turn an otherwise protected civilian into a 
legitimate military target subject to lawful attack. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
pp. 87-113. For four critiques of the ICRC’s position, and the organization’s official response, see: NYU/JILP, Forum on 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities”, pp. 637-916. 
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The lawful scope for targeted killings by governments, and resulting considerations 
about transparency and accountability 
Martin Scheinin* 
1. Targeted killings, i.e. the intentional killing of a human person resulting from his or her 
identification as a lawful target for the usea of deadly force, are in principle permitted during war or 
non-international armed conflict. Killing members of the military force of the adversary is perhaps not 
war is all about but it is inherent in the conduct of any war. And when states fighting a war start to kill 
people, they are required to do so through proper targeting, i.e. through complying with the principle 
of distinction. Military objectives and military persons are to be targeted, distinguishing them from 
civilian objects and civilians. That said, international humanitarian law does not provide legal 
justification for the use of targeted killings, using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or otherwise, 
unless multiple cumulative conditions are simultaneously met. As this contribution focuses on what is 
permissible for states (governments), the following discussion will not address the question whether 
and to what extent targeted killings by non-state entities might find justification in international 
humanitarian law, even when treated as a crime under the laws of the country where the killing 
occurred or of which the victim was a national.  
2. A targeted killing by a government can only be lawful under international law if that state itself is a 
party to an ongoing armed conflict and when all of the following cumulative conditions are met: 
a) there is an ongoing armed conflict, international or non-international in character, 
b) between identified parties, be they states or armed groups that can be distinguished from other 
organized or non-organized actors and meet the criteria of being capable of being party to an 
armed conflict;
1
 and 
c) any person who is identified as a target is associated with such a party to an armed conflict, 
d) and personally a legitimate target (either because of being a combatant in the military force of the 
enemy state or because of having a continuous military-type function within the non-state actor 
that is a party to an armed conflict, or while temporarily participating as a ‘civilian’ in the conduct 
of hostilities);
2
 and 
e) the killing takes place within a geographical space that constitutes a ‘theatre’ for the ongoing 
armed conflict or has a genuine nexus with the actual theatre because operations within the theatre 
are being carried out or directed from the outside. 
3. The above cumulative conditions result in a highly demanding test, unlikely to be met in at least of 
a part of the current usage of UAVs by the Barack Obama administration of United States of 
America.
3
 There is a wide gap between the above-listed cumulative conditions for lawfulness and what 
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3
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has been publicly stated as the parameters and the justification for the US policy and practice. A part 
of this gap relates to the relationships between the USA and other sovereign nations. While this gap 
may make it difficult to assess directly the lawfulness or unlawfulness of US practice or many of the 
individual cases of targeted killing, there certainly are conclusions that can be drawn from the gap 
itself, as requirements for transparency and accountability that could make a concrete assessment of 
lawfulness possible. The proposed conclusions for transparency and accountability are: 
a) any state that is involved in targeted killings, directly or through aiding and abetting (including 
through the provision of intelligence), needs to make its involvement publicly known;
4
 
b) this relates also, and in particular, to any territorial state that is allowing another state to conduct 
targeted killings within its borders;
5
  
c) any state that is involved in targeted killings must be able to explain in precise terms what are the 
entities against which it is in an ongoing armed conflict;
6
 
d) targeted killings not based on the identification of the parties to an armed conflict but on 
behavioral patterns or political like-mindedness with a party to an armed conflict, are excluded; 
e) any state that is involved in targeted killings must be able to explain in precise terms what are the 
criteria used to define an individual as a target;
7
 and 
f) any state that is involved in targeted killings must specify, also for transparency and accountability 
reasons, what is the chain of command, and how it justifies under international humanitarian law 
the eventual use of plainclothes officials (e.g. members of an intelligence agency) or private 
contractors in its use of military force, also in relation to eventual consequences for combatant 
immunity and its extension by analogy to situations of non-international armed conflict. 
4. Human rights law is not ignorant in relation to killings during an armed conflict. As reflected in 
article 6, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights the first and foremost 
dimension of the right to life is the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life. After much 
confused and confusing discussion on the proper relationship between international humanitarian law 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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and international human rights law during an armed conflict, including on the proper meaning and 
scope of the maxim of lex specialis, there seems to be wide consensus about the idea that what is and 
what is not an arbitrary deprivation of life under human rights during an armed conflict can be 
resolved by relying on the interpretive effect of the rules of international humanitarian law within the 
framework of human rights law. As formulated by the Human Rights Committee in its General 
Comment No. 31 on general state obligations, and building upon earlier General Comment No. 29 on 
states of emergency, human rights law “applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules 
of international humanitarian law are applicable. While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more 
specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the 
interpretation of Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”8 
This line of reasoning will provide a basis for the assessment that a targeted killing that was conducted 
in accordance with international humanitarian law, pursuant to the cumulative conditions spelled out 
above in paragraph 2, did not amount to a violation of international human rights law, either. 
Conversely, the same line of reasoning will produce the outcome that a targeted killing that did not 
meet that strict test of lawfulness under international humanitarian law, is already by definition also a 
violation of human rights law.  
5. Outside armed conflict there can never be justification for targeted killings. Therefore, also the 
frameworks for transparency and accountability must be geared towards disclosing and assessing any 
loss of human life in relation to the applicable legal framework. The loss of human life can be justified 
in limited situations: 
a) Genuine individual self-defence by law enforcement officials, with the use of deadly force as the 
method of last resort. Normally, this would entail following the protocol of oral warnings, warning 
shots and non-lethal force to contain the threat. There must be efficient internal and external 
(independent) mechanisms for the establishment of the facts, so that the genuine nature of a 
situation of individual self-defence can be properly addressed. 
b) A genuine imminent threat to the life of others, with the use of deadly force as the method of last 
resort. Again, this would normally entail following the protocol of oral warnings, warning shots 
and non-lethal force to contain the threat. The same internal and external mechanisms as in 5 (a) 
must be able to assess whether the protocol was followed. 
c) Despite of 5 (b) being the paradigmatic case, there may be some exceptional forms of terrorist 
attacks that justify a qualification. When dealing with a suicide bomber who all things considered 
is just about to detonate the suicide belt, intentionally or as a physiological response to the use of 
non-lethal force, then the use of deadly force may be the first measure (a bullet into the brain as 
the most efficient, if not only, method to prevent an intentional or non-intentional physiological 
response). Another similar scenario may relate to certain forms of hostage-taking where no other 
means are available to address an imminent threat of killing a hostage. The internal and external 
mechanisms referred to in 5 (a) must be able to investigate that such conduct was a response to an 
imminent threat, and did not result from any targeting for what the individual was expected to do 
in the future. 
d) Internal and external frameworks of transparency and accountability that operate ex post facto and 
assess the concrete circumstances when deadly force was used, must be complemented by the 
same or other mechanisms (such as the Ombudsman or a Human Rights Commission) being in a 
position to assess that resource allocation, training and tactical planning in relation to how violent 
threats are responded to, are geared towards such measures of early intervention that avoid ending 
up in a situation where the use of deadly force as such will be justified. Such measures include 
state-of-the-art training, early stopping of crimes being prepared, overmanning, the use of best 
technology, etc. 
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6. A third type of use of lethal force must be briefly mentioned: assassinations as secret operations by 
intelligence agencies. They could also be called targeted killings. It almost goes without saying that 
there is no justification for such acts in international law. This is reflected in the fact that the 
assassinations are kept secret and if a country is faced with an allegation about using them, they are 
routinely denied.
9
 What this category of targeted killings adds to the theme is the need to secure that 
civilian and military intelligence agencies are under effective oversight and subject to accountability 
mechanisms.
10
 The same conclusion of a need for oversight and accountability flows also from the fact 
that intelligence cooperation entails that the use of UAVs for targeted killings in the context of what 
one state (the United States) considers to be an armed conflict, relying on intelligence provided by 
other states (e.g., the United Kingdom). Unfortunately, as oversight mechanisms for intelligence 
agencies often were designed so as not to cover the sensitive practices of intelligence-sharing across 
borders, there may still exist accountability gaps in this area.  
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Report on the Legal Regulation of Targeted Killing in Israel 
Eyal Benvenisti* 
This memorandum describes the legal framework that governs the practice of “targeted killing” in 
Israel. The memo addresses the following questions: The legal sources of the framework (Part I), its 
scope of application: when and where does the legal framework concerning targeted killings apply? 
(Part II), the normative constraints on targeting decisions: when is targeting permitted? (Part III), the 
procedural constraints: how decisions on targeting should be reached and the necessary review 
procedures (Part IV).  
I. The legal sources of the framework 
In its “Targeted Killing” judgment of December 2006,1 the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) outlined the 
legal framework that applies to the targeting of “civilians taking direct part in hostilities.” This general 
framework was subsequently endorsed in another judgment (“the Shechade judgment”) that addressed 
the question whether a criminal investigation should be opened to examine the killing of Salah 
Shechade, a senior Hamas operative, which also killed 14 civilians.
2
 While the Shechade case was 
pending, the Israeli Prime Minister appointed a commission to investigate that killing and to draw 
general and specific conclusions. The “Special Commission to Investigate a Targeted Killing 
Operation – Salah Shechade” (“The Shechade Commission”) presented its report in February 2011.3 
Before that, in 2010, The IDF Military Advocate General put forward his interpretation of the legal 
framework to the “Turkel Commission” which investigated, inter alia, the general reporting and 
investigating practices of the IDF in relation to suspected violations of IHL.
4
 The Turkel 
Commission’s report on this matter, which was submitted to the Israeli government in January 2013, 
includes general recommendations for reviewing military activities and hence is relevant also to 
incidents of targeted killings.
5
  
The legal framework as expounded by the court and elaborated by the Shechade Commission and 
the IDF Military Advocate General is based on the law of international armed conflict (hereinafter 
IHL) and specifically on Articles 51(3) and 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, which the ISC 
determined to reflect customary international law. This memo will therefore relate to the legal regime 
under IHL. Note that the ISC did not rely on international human rights law (IHRL) standards (which 
the Israeli government holds are not applicable outside Israel). But as is indicated in Parts III and IV, 
elements of IHRL resonate in the IHL-based regime that the ISC puts forward. Part V concludes. 
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II. Scope: when and where does the legal framework concerning targeted killings apply? 
According to the ISC, the legal regime of IHL applies to targeted killings taking place beyond the 
Israeli borders, regardless of the identity of the enemy: “This law applies in any case of an armed 
conflict of international character – in other words, one that crosses the borders of the state .” (HCJ 
769/02, at para. 18)). In other words, according to the ISC, IHL, and the specific norms and 
procedures regulating targeted killings apply to military activities beyond Israeli borders even if the 
enemy is a non-state entity. Specifically, this law applies to operations in the West Bank and Gaza.  
The Military Judge Advocate put forward a narrower understanding of the above judgment. In his 
view presented to the Turkel Commission, the legal framework should be less strict in the context of 
“extensive combat activity, that takes place in an area that is not under effective Israeli control” and 
when the IDF is “operating against an organized armed force that maintains effective control in a 
certain area.”6 The Turkel Commission however did not distinguish between different types of military 
engagements. 
III. Normative constraints: when is targeting permitted? 
The relevant norms are API Article 51(3) which prohibits the targeting of civilians, “unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities,” and Article 51(5(b) which prohibits excessive harm 
to civilians. The ISC elaborates on the key components of the two provisions. It acknowledges that it 
is especially problematic to attempt to provide general tests for what amounts to “taking direct part,” 
“for such time,” and “excessive harm” to uninvolved civilians. Faced with this difficult task, the court 
adopts an ad-hoc approach which replaces the abstract definition with concrete decision-making 
procedures to limit unnecessary killing of both combatants and civilians. President Barak writes that 
“there is no escaping going case by case, while narrowing the area of disagreement” (paras. 34, 39, 
40). Accordingly, he writes, “the following four things should be said:”  
“[F]irst, well based information is needed before categorizing a civilian as falling into one of the 
discussed categories. […] Information which has been most thoroughly verified is needed 
regarding the identity and activity of the civilian who is allegedly taking part in the hostilities […] 
Second, a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing 
so, if a less harmful means can be employed.[…] 
Third, after an attack on a civilian suspected of taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a 
thorough investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the 
circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed (retroactively). That investigation must be 
independent.[…] 
In appropriate cases it is appropriate to pay compensation as a result of harm caused to an innocent 
civilian […] 
Last, if the harm is not only to a civilian directly participating in the hostilities, rather also to 
innocent civilians nearby, the harm to them is collateral damage. That damage must withstand the 
proportionality test.”
7
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IV. Procedural constraints: how decisions on targeting should be reached? 
1. Ex-ante decision-making procedures: 
The Shehade Commission mentions that following the event as well as the Targeted Killing judgment 
the IDF and the General Security Services (GSS) adopted and followed written routines concerning 
the decision-making procedures related to the planning and implementation of targeting operations. 
According to the Commission, the GSS’ written routine directed the decision-makers to accumulate, 
assess, document and retain for inspection all relevant information concerning the presence of 
uninvolved civilians. The IDF Chief of Staff was directly responsible for targeted killing operations, 
and the decision-making involved representatives of the army intelligence and legal advisors. 
Approval of operation would be given first by the Head of the GSS and the Chief of Staff, which 
would then be submitted to the approval of both the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister. All 
correspondence would be taped or otherwise documented to facilitate retroactive review.
8
 
The Shechade Commission found that the targeting of Shechade was based on inaccurate 
information and other flaws in the decision-making process and hence went further to elaborate the 
specific procedures that it found necessary to establish. Its lengthy recommendations are quoted in 
Appendix A. 
2. Retroactive independent investigation: 
In its Shechade judgment, the ISC endorsed the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint a commission of 
inquiry composed of a retired Military Advocate General (Chairperson), a retired Major General of the 
IDF and a retired commander of the General Security Services, which the court regarded a sufficiently 
independent commission.
9
 The Shechade Commission thought that it was sufficiently neutral and 
objective and lamented the refusal of the lawyers representing the civilian victims to appear before it 
(pp. 19-20).  
The Turkel Commission’s recommendations provide a comprehensive and systemic treatment of 
the ex-post investigation processes in cases of suspected violations of IHL. It distinguishes between a 
preliminary fact finding assessment process aimed at collecting relevant information about an alleged 
incident that raises “a reasonable suspicion that an offense has been committed,” as the basis for the 
MAG’s decision whether an investigation is necessary. The Commission outlines a mechanism for 
carrying out a fact–finding assessment, conducted by a special team to be established at the IDF, with 
expertise in the theatres of military operations, international law and investigations. The function of 
the team will be to provide the MAG with as much information as possible, within a period of time 
stipulated in procedures, in order to enable the MAG to decide whether to begin an investigation. 
If the preliminary assessments find a “credible accusation” or “reasonable suspicion” that an 
offense has been committed an “effective” investigation will have to commence, subject to the 
requirements of independence, impartiality, effectiveness and thoroughness, promptness, and 
transparency. Every decision of the MAG not to open an investigation should state the reasons for the 
decision. 
The Turkel Commission also emphasizes the need, and makes certain suggestions to ensure, that 
the MAG is, on the one hand, independent from the IDF Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense, 
and on the other hand is subordinate to the authority of the (civilian) Attorney General of the State of 
Israel.  
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Note that these are general recommendations, applicable to ensure general compliance with IHL. 
The obligation to start a preliminary inquiry starts when there is “a reasonable suspicion that an 
offense has been committed.” In contrasts, in cases of targeted killing, an “independent” investigation 
must always take part as an integral part of the process. Nevertheless, the general institutional 
recommendations of the Turkel Commission, if followed, could bolster the independence of that 
investigation and render it more accountable.  
V. Concluding Observations 
This memorandum reported on the legal framework that governs the practice of “targeted killing” in 
Israel. The aim reporting, not assessing its legality. Nevertheless, because the legal framework as 
reported puts much faith in the robustness of the institutional and procedural constraints, one comment 
may be appropriate. 
As may have become clear, the framework as outlined reflects much trust in institutional and 
procedural guarantees as key to ensure compliance with the substantive legal obligations. This 
assumption – which informs every effort to regulate decision-making – relies on the hope that in a 
deliberative process, in which participants have different opinions and engage in open and informed 
deliberations, the outcome eventually will be a well-balanced and lawful decision. But when all the 
involved parties conform to a certain vision of legality, often the mere compliance with the procedure 
will not prove an effective restraint. For this reason, while the institutional and procedural constraints 
are necessary, they should not be regarded as sufficient. External mechanisms of review, including 
parliamentary and judicial review, including individual sanctions, and open public debate, are also 
necessary to ensure that the decision-makers do not get accustomed to “follow the script” of the rules 
without seriously contemplating the justification for action in each case.  
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Appendix A: The “Systemic Recommendations” of the Shechade Commission10 
[Note: recommendations marked with * appear only in the Hebrew version, hence my translations]  
1. The security forces must incorporate and internalize, on an ongoing basis, the principles and norms 
of Israeli and international law and the ethical and moral foundations on which they are predicated, 
particularly in all that relates to harm to uninvolved civilians resulting from a targeted killing against a 
legitimate target.  
2. The principle of proportionality must be carefully adhered to. A derivative of this principle is that a 
strike should not be carried out, even if the target is in and of itself legitimate, if the expected harm to 
uninvolved civilians is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage to be derived from 
the strike, and this in each case according to its circumstances. In this context, maximum caution must 
be exercised in the selection of the method of striking the target and the type of weapon to be used in 
the operation. 
3.* Written guidelines must be adopted concerning the legal, principled, normative and moral 
principles concerning preventive targeting
11
 in general and the risk to uninvolved civilians in 
particular. These guidelines will inform those involved in planning and implementing the preventive 
targeting, the decision-makers and the approving authorities.  
It is recommended that the guidelines be formulated by the Military Advocate General together with 
other relevant bodies (such as the [GSS] Legal Advisor, the IDF Chief Education Officer and the 
Israel Attorney General). 
4. The [GSS] must expand and reinforce the system of intelligence-gathering in all that relates to the 
risk of harm to uninvolved civilians resulting from a targeted killing against a legitimate target.  
5. The [GSS], which accompanies all stages of the operation, must ensure that there are clear 
procedures for the transfer on an ongoing basis of existing positive information and for highlighting 
information which is incomplete, to all the parties involved in the operation.  
6.* The GSS must outline procedures for the transfer of information and indicate missing information, 
both internally and when communicating with other actors. 
7.* When present in deliberations, the GSS representative must ensure that the participants understand 
both the positive information and the information that is missing. 
8.* The information circulated within the GSS and with other units, must distinguish between facts, 
assumption and hypotheses.  
9. A transcript of every deliberation involving a decision regarding a targeted killing will be prepared 
in real time. The real-time records must be kept until after the operation is examined by an external 
committee, to the extent such a review is required by the guidelines outlined in the Supreme Court 
ruling. 
10.* The documentation of real time [information] must be kept until the operation is examined by an 
external committee, as much as such inquiry is needed according to the guidelines determined by the 
Supreme Court. 
11. The authorized IDF bodies must examine the involvement of the Intelligence Division in targeted 
killing operations and determine a clear policy with regard to such involvement. This is necessary in 
light of claims made by high-ranking Intelligence Division officials in their testimony to the 
Commission, that in their view they were not properly involved in the said operation.  
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12. The security and political echelons must formulate a short and concise written procedure for the 
transfer of material and the decisions of the Director of [GSS] and the IDF Chief of General Staff to 
the political echelon.  
13.* The decisions of the Director of GSS and the IDF Chief of General Staff will be written and 
forwarded to the political echelon via the Military Secretaries. They will include the factual 
background that served as the basis for the decisions and the reasons for making them. 
14. Differences of opinion or substantial reservations among senior officials in the mechanisms 
involved, which can significantly affect the decision of the political echelon, shall be made known to 
the latter. Special emphasis shall be placed on the risk of harm to uninvolved civilians. 
15.* The emphasis in the information forwarded to the political echelon will be put on the risk of harm 
to the uninvolved, while differentiating between facts, assumptions and hypotheses.  
16.* The Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister will consider in each case, according to its 
specific circumstances, the summoning of the IDF Chief of Staff, the Head of the GSS and anybody 
else they deem appropriate, to answer question and to deliberate unclear issues if such arise. 
17. The legal advice accompanying deliberations by the security echelons prior to making a 
substantive decision regarding the carrying out of a targeted killing must be expanded and 
institutionalized. The security services must advise the political echelon of the position of their legal 
advisers, to the extent that this would have implications for the considerations which the political 
echelon must take into account.  
18. The Commission is aware of the pressures of time, place and circumstances to which all those 
involved in the planning and implementation of a targeted killing are subject. Therefore, the said 
recommendations are set down subject to those exceptions demanded by situations of pressure and 
constraints which prevent full compliance with the regulations. In such instances, the procedures may 
be deviated from or shortened, but only on condition that the essence of Israeli and international legal 
principles and the instructions outlined in the Supreme Court ruling is not impacted.  
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Drones and targeted killing: Defining a European position* 
Anthony Dworkin** 
Since the United States carried out the first lethal drone strike in Afghanistan in October 2001, drones 
have emerged from obscurity to become the most contentious aspect of modern warfare. Armed 
drones -- or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) -- are now the United States’ weapons platform of 
choice in its military campaign against the dispersed terrorist network of al-Qaeda. They offer an 
unprecedented ability to track and kill individuals with great precision, without any risk to the lives of 
the forces that use them, and at a much lower cost than traditional manned aircraft. The military 
attraction of remotely piloted UAVs is self-evident, but they have also attracted enormous controversy 
and public concern. Above all, the regular use of drones to kill people who are located far from any 
zone of conventional hostilities strikes many people as a disturbing development that threatens to 
undermine the international rule of law. 
The United States, the United Kingdom and Israel are the only countries currently known to 
possess armed drones. The UK Ministry of Defence has confirmed their use during military operations 
in Afghanistan, and Israeli NGOs have documented the use of UAVs by Israel’s armed forces during 
and after the 2008-2009 Cast Lead operation in Gaza.
1
 The United States has also used armed drones 
in its wars in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq.
2
 However the United States’ most disputed use of drones 
has been directed at suspected terrorists or members of armed groups in a series of troubled or lawless 
regions across a sweep of countries around the Middle East, encompassing Pakistan, Yemen and 
Somalia, which are not otherwise theatres of US military operations. (The United States has recently 
opened a new drone base in Niger, raising fears that armed drones might at some point be used in the 
Sahel or North Africa, though so far the base appears to be used only for surveillance flights.) 
Although no clear record of such strikes exists, one investigative group that tracks the use of drones 
estimates that the US has carried out 370 strikes in Pakistan, killing in the range of 2,500-3,500 
people; around 50 strikes in Yemen, killing 240-349 people; and between 3 and 9 strikes in Somalia, 
killing from 7-27 people.
3
 The frequency of US “out-of-theatre” drone strikes has increased 
significantly under Barack Obama’s presidency. 
The United States’ use of drones for targeted killing away from any battlefield has become the 
focus of increasing attention and concern in Europe, as in the United States and around the world. In a 
recent opinion poll, people in all European countries sampled were opposed to the use of drones to kill 
extremists outside the battlefield and the majority of European legal scholars believe many if not all of 
these strikes to be unlawful.
4
 But in contrast to the EU’s reaction to President Bush’s counterterrorism 
actions in the years after September 11, such as the detention of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo Bay, 
European leaders and officials have responded to President Obama’s escalation of drone strikes in a 
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notably muted way. The EU and its member states have not challenged or worked to alter US policy, 
or set out an alternative vision of when drone strikes are acceptable. Nor have they made any moves in 
the direction of developing credible international standards for the kinds of military operations that 
UAVs make possible. 
By far the strongest European official statement on the subject came in response to the first known 
drone strike by the United States outside battlefield conditions, the killing of suspected al-Qaeda 
member Qaed Sinan al-Harithi in Yemen in November 2002. Anna Lindh, then Swedish foreign 
minister, described the action as “a summary execution that violates human rights”.5 There have been 
few if any public statements from the EU about the legal parameters for the use of lethal force since 
that time, even as the number of drone strikes has increased and public concern has mounted. Officials 
from EU member states have evidently made clear in discussions with the United States that they do 
not share the legal analysis on which US policy rests. In September 2011, John Brennan, then the 
president’s top counterterrorism advisor, acknowledged that “Others in the international community—
including some of our closest allies and partners—take a different view of the geographic scope of the 
conflict [against al-Qaeda], limiting it only to the ‘hot’ battlefields.”6 Nevertheless, beyond privately 
noting their differences with the US position, there is little sign that EU member states have made any 
concerted attempt to influence US policy, or call for the development of shared transatlantic standards 
that would constrain the use of this new weapons platform. 
Arguments for a European Stance 
European officials may have some sympathy with President Obama’s efforts to recalibrate US 
counterterrorism policy in the face of domestic political opposition, and may recognise that the United 
States continues to face a terrorist threat from outside its borders that does not admit of simple or 
straightforward solutions. Nevertheless, the EU has strong reasons to define its own position on drones 
and targeted killing, and engage more actively with the United States on the subject. If it fails to do so, 
it risks neglecting its own interests and missing an opportunity to help shape global standards in an 
area that is vital to the international rule of law.  
The EU is committed to put human rights and the rule of law at the centre of its foreign policy, and 
many Europeans are likely to consider the widespread use of drones outside battlefield conditions 
incompatible with these principles. The EU has in the past in the past condemned Israeli targeted 
killing of Palestinians; for instance the EU Council issued a statement in March 2004 describing the 
recent Israeli strike against Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as an “extra-judicial killing” and 
added, “Not only are extra-judicial killings contrary to international law, they undermine the concept 
of the rule of law which is a key element in the fight against terrorism”.7 Although there are of course 
differences in the contexts of US and Israeli actions, the EU should continue to use its influence to 
work against the spread of a practice that it has previously opposed.  
US drone strike practices also complicate intelligence cooperation between EU member states and 
the United States, because of the risk that information passed to the United States will be used as the 
basis for lethal strikes that might be considered illegal in the source countries. In December 2012 the 
British High Court dismissed a case brought by a young Pakistani man whose father was killed by a 
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drone strike, seeking to establish whether information provided by British intelligence services was 
used by the CIA’s drone programme; the case is currently under appeal.8 The German government has 
had a policy for the last few years of not passing information to the United States that could be used 
for targeted killing outside battlefield conditions, but activists argue that it is impossible to know 
which piece of information might form part of a mosaic used in targeting decisions.
9
 In the meantime, 
a German federal prosecutor is investigating the legality of the killing of a German citizen of Turkish 
origin by a US drone strike in Pakistan in October 2010. In Denmark, a public controversy has blown 
up over claims by a Danish citizen, Morten Storm, that he acted as a Western agent inside Yemeni 
jihadist circles and helped the CIA track the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed by a 
drone strike in September 2011, with the knowledge of Danish intelligence services. 
European governments are increasingly interested in acquiring armed drones for their own military 
forces, and in some cases encountering strong public or political opposition. The German Defence 
Minister Thomas de Mazieres has announced his wish to purchase armed UAVs for the Bundeswehr, 
prompting campaigning groups to launch an appeal entitled “No Combat Drones” and provoking 
criticism from opposition parties. In the UK, the shift of control of British drones from the United 
States to an RAF base in Lincolnshire led to a demonstration of several hundred people. Italy, the 
Netherlands and Poland are among other EU member states that are seeking or considering the 
purchase of armed drones, and European defence consortia are exploring the possibility of 
manufacturing both surveillance and armed UAVs in Europe. To defuse the public suspicion that 
attaches to drones, which many defence officials regard as a vital component of contemporary armed 
forces, EU governments have an interest in reducing the controversy provoked by US actions and 
developing a clearer European line about when lethal strikes against individuals are permissible. 
Beyond Europe, too, armed drones are proliferating (and developing in sophistication) rapidly. 
Perhaps the strongest reason for the EU to define a clearer position on drones and targeted killing is to 
prevent the expansive and opaque policies followed by the United States until now from setting an 
unchallenged global precedent. Already Chinese state media has reported that the country’s Public 
Security Ministry had developed a plan to carry out a drone strike against a Burmese drug trafficker, 
implicated in the killing of several Chinese sailors, though the suggestion was apparently overruled.
10
 
It will be difficult for the EU to condemn the use of drones by other states if it fails to define its own 
position more clearly. Rather than allowing such a development, the EU should commit itself to 
clarifying and promoting its own vision, and ultimately explore the possibility of working with the 
United States to develop a new set of guiding principles on how fundamental principles of 
international law apply to this new sphere of operations. 
Defining the Problem 
It is unnecessary to seek to ban UAVs altogether – even if there were any realistic prospect that the 
spread of drones could be halted. Similarly, despite the popular image of drones as “killer robots”, the 
issues raised by remotely piloted aircraft such as drones are very different from those concerning 
autonomous weapons systems (in which the decision to kill is taken by the machine itself), which a 
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number of countries are thought to be researching.
11
 Essentially, remotely piloted drones are 
problematic because they facilitate the killing of targeted individuals outside battlefield conditions, 
extending the use of force into areas and even countries where it might not traditionally have been 
contemplated. The most effective way to address this problem would be to work towards a clearer 
international standard for the use of force under such circumstances, both through discussions within 
the EU and dialogue with the United States. 
The Evolution of US Policy 
It would be particularly timely for the EU to clarify its views on the use of lethal force against 
members of non-state groups and to engage in a dialogue with the United States on the subject because 
of the evidence that US policy is not static but evolving. President Obama himself has spoken of the 
importance of “creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned 
weapons... partly because technology may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”12 A 
number of retired US military officers have warned that an excessive reliance on drones could be 
counter-productive for US national security, and the administration has reduced the number of drone 
strikes sharply in recent months.
13
  
Former administration officials have said the United States is at fault for not doing more to work 
with allies to develop global rules on drone strikes. The former State Department legal advisor, Harold 
Koh, said recently that the administration “should be more willing to discuss international legal 
standards for use of drones, so that our actions do not inadvertently empower other nations and actors 
who would use drones inconsistent with the law”.14 The United States’ European partners are in a 
position to use their influence to support those groups within the administration who are pushing for 
improved standards and greater internationalization. As one former Obama administration official put 
it, the US government is subject to few domestic checks on its interpretation of international law in 
this area, so the reaction of allies is “the main test and constraint for the administration... if other states 
don’t object, the conclusion is that they are not concerned.”15  
Armed Conflict or Self-Defence? 
In order to understand where the inflection points are in US policy, and the way in which EU could 
most usefully intervene, it is necessary to look more closely at the evolution and proclaimed legal 
basis for US policy. The targeted killing programme began as part of a broader campaign to “find, fix, 
and finish” members of the terrorist network responsible for the attacks of September 11, a covert 
global manhunt operated both by the CIA and Pentagon Special Forces. For several years the drone 
programme was not officially acknowledged, but in the last three years administration officials have 
gradually revealed some of the legal basis and procedures for drones strikes, and some official 
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documents have been published or leaked to the media. Nevertheless several important aspects of the 
legal justification and policy guidelines for US drone strikes remain unclear. 
US officials have at times offered two different legal justifications for the use of lethal force 
without being clear about the precise boundary between them. The first and most important 
justification relies on the claim that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban and associated forces, authorized for the purpose of US domestic law by a Congressional 
resolution (the Authorization for Use of Military Force, or AUMF) passed on 14 September 2001.  
At times, however, administration officials have added an additional or alternative justification: the 
United States can act in self-defence against imminent threats to its national security. For example 
John Brennan gave a speech in April 2012 in which he said that “the United States is in an armed 
conflict with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may 
also use force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defence” (emphasis added). This 
justification is evidently designed to address situations where the United States feels the need to use 
lethal force outside the boundaries of an existing armed conflict.  
Because the administration has not been clear about the precise justification for the strikes it has 
carried out so far, we cannot be certain whether all of them fall within the scope of the “armed 
conflict” justification. Some scholars who have followed the administration’s pronouncements closely 
believe this to be the case.
16
 Another possible explanation for the apparent ambiguity in the US 
position is that there were disagreements within the administration about the scope of the alleged 
armed conflict, and that the formula of alternative justifications was chosen to allow flexibility 
between differing views.
17
  
The significance of the distinction between the armed conflict and self-defence justifications can 
best be understood with reference to the different paradigms that they appeal to. The armed conflict 
justification is based on what could be described as a logic of collective membership: individuals can 
be targeted on the basis of their status as members of a group against which the United States is 
engaged in hostilities. The self-defence justification is based on a logic of individual threat: 
individuals can be killed only after a determination in their particular case that a strike is necessary to 
avoid an imminent threat to life that cannot be prevented in any other way. The second justification 
thus seems to entail a higher threshold to be met before targeted killing can be authorized – though the 
administration’s use of behavioural criteria to determine membership of al-Qaeda and its associated 
forces means the distinction is not in practice a hard-and-fast one. 
Even though the United States has relied essentially on an armed conflict justification, officials 
have sometimes suggested that they focused primarily on those individuals who posed the greatest 
threat. The details that have emerged about US targeting practices in the past few years raise questions 
about how closely this approach has been followed in practice. An analysis published by McClatchy 
Newspapers in April, based on classified intelligence reports, claimed that 265 out of 482 individuals 
killed in Pakistan in a 12-month period up to September 2011 were not senior al-Qaeda operatives but 
instead were assessed as Afghan, Pakistani and unknown extremists.
18
 It has been widely reported that 
in both Pakistan and Yemen the United States has at times carried out “signature strikes” or “Terrorist 
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Attack Disruption Strikes” in which groups are targeted based not on knowledge of their identity but 
on a pattern of behaviour that complies with a set of indicators for militant activity. It is widely 
thought that these attacks have accounted for many of the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes. 
In both Pakistan and Yemen, there may have been times when some drone strikes – including 
signature strikes – could perhaps best be understood as counter-insurgency actions in support of 
government forces in an internal armed conflict or civil war, and in this way lawful under the laws of 
armed conflict. However the United States has never offered this justification for its strikes, and by 
presenting them as part of a global armed conflict it is helping to set an expansive precedent that is 
damaging to the international rule of law. 
Obama’s New Policy on Drones 
It is against this background that Obama’s recent counterterrorism speech and the policy directive he 
announced at the same time should be judged. On the subject of remotely-piloted aircraft and targeted 
killing, there were two key aspects to his intervention. First, he suggested that the military element in 
US counterterrorism is likely to be scaled back further in coming months, and that he envisages a time 
in the not-too-distant future when the fight against the al-Qaeda network will no longer qualify as an 
armed conflict. He said that “the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat” 
and that while al-Qaeda franchises and other terrorists continued to plot against the United States, “the 
scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11”. Obama promised that 
he would not sign legislation that expanded the mandate of the AUMF, and proclaimed that the United 
States’ “systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all 
wars, must end.”19 The tone of Obama’s speech contrasted strongly with that of US military officials 
who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee the week before; Michael Sheehan, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, said then that the 
end of the armed conflict was “a long way off” and appeared to say that it might continue for 10 to 20 
years.
20
  
Secondly, Obama appeared to lay out new restrictions on drone strikes in the guidance he signed 
the day before his speech (the guidance remains classified but a summary has been released). The 
guidance sets out standards and procedures for drone strikes “that are either already in place or will be 
transitioned into place over time”. Outside areas of active hostilities, lethal force will only be used 
“when capture is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to address the threat 
effectively”. It will only be used against a target “that poses a continuing, imminent threat to US 
persons”. And there must be “near-certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed”.21  
However, the impact of the new policy will depend very much on how the concept of a continuing, 
imminent threat is interpreted. The administration has not given any definition of this phrase, and the 
leaked Department of Justice white paper contained a strikingly broad interpretation of imminence; 
among other points, the white paper said that it “does not require the United States to have clear 
evidence that a specific attack on US persons or interests will take place in the immediate future” and 
that it “must incorporate considerations of the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of 
reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks on 
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Americans”.22The presidential policy guidance captures the apparent concerns behind the 
administration’s policy more honestly by including the criterion of continuing threat, but this begs the 
question of how the notions of a “continuing” and “imminent” threat relate to each other. 
It is also notable that the new standards announced by President Obama represent a policy decision 
by the United States, not a revised interpretation of its legal obligations. In his speech, Obama drew a 
distinction between legality and morality, pointing out that “to say a military tactic is legal, or even 
effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance”. The suggestion was that the United States 
was scaling back its use of drones out of practical or normative considerations, not because of any new 
conviction that the its previous legal claims went too far. The background assertion that the United 
States is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and associated forces, and might therefore 
lawfully kill any member of the opposing forces wherever they were found, remains in place to serve 
as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it. 
Looking forward, Obama’s speech strongly suggests that the time leading up to the withdrawal of 
most US forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 could be a crucial period for the evolution of US 
policy, and a significant window for the EU to pursue discussions with the United States. When US 
troops are no longer fighting on the ground in Afghanistan, there will be no conventional military 
operations against al-Qaeda around which a notional armed conflict can be focused, and no zone of 
hostilities in which status-based targeting is justified. Nor will it be possible to justify drone strikes in 
Pakistan as necessary to prevent attacks on US forces. Much of the language of Obama’s speech 
suggests that he regards the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan both as a likely reason for further 
reducing drone strikes, and perhaps as a logical moment to reconsider the nature of the campaign 
against al-Qaeda more broadly. There is no guarantee that Obama will be ready to declare the armed 
conflict over at that point, or even to rethink the legal prerogatives he claims in the conflict, but he has 
clearly flagged these questions for consideration. 
Defining a European Position 
If this is the US position, what about the EU? EU member states have not yet tried to formulate a 
common position on the use of lethal force outside battlefield conditions. Some EU member states 
may not have settled views on the subject, they may incline to different views on some unresolved 
questions of law, and they are subject to somewhat different restrictions through their domestic legal 
frameworks. Nevertheless it seems possible to construct a central core of agreement that would be 
shared across the EU. The foundation of this common vision would be the rejection of the notion of a 
de-territorialized global armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda. Across the EU there 
would be agreement that the confrontation between a state and a non-state group only rises to the level 
of an armed conflict if the non-state group meets a threshold for organization, and if there are intense 
hostilities between the two parties.
23
 The consensus view within the EU would be that these conditions 
require that fighting be concentrated within a specific zone (or zones) of hostilities. Instead of a global 
war, Europeans would tend to see a series of discrete situations, each of which need to be evaluated on 
their own merits to decide whether they qualify as an armed conflict. 
Outside an armed conflict, the default European assumption would that the threat of terrorism 
should be confronted within a law enforcement framework. This framework would not absolutely 
prohibit the deliberate killing of individuals, but it would set an extremely high threshold for its use: 
for example it might be permitted where strictly necessary to prevent an imminent threat to human life 
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or a particularly serious crime involving a grave threat to life.
24
 Where the threat was sufficiently 
serious, the state’s response might legitimately include the use of military force, but every use of lethal 
force would have to be justified as a necessary and proportionate response to an imminent threat. 
Finally, EU states might perhaps agree that in the face of an armed attack or an imminent armed 
attack, states can use force on the territory of another state without its consent, if that state is unable or 
unwilling to act effectively to restrain the attack. 
Engaging the US on Drone Strikes 
On the basis of these views, the EU already has the foundation for a stepped-up engagement with the 
United States on drones and targeted killing. At the heart of the EU position is the belief that the use of 
lethal force outside zones of active hostilities is an exceptional measure that can only be justified on 
the basis of a serious and imminent threat to human life. At a time when drone technology is 
proliferating rapidly, EU leaders should be more forthright in making this argument publicly – 
especially since President Obama has now essentially adopted it as an element of his policy. While 
Europeans may be reluctant to accuse Obama of having violated international law, they can assert their 
own vision and encourage Obama to follow through on his rhetoric by elevating the idea of a strict 
imminent threat-based approach to the use of deadly force outside the battlefield. European leaders 
and officials should also welcome Obama’s latest moves to restrain drone strikes and his intimation 
that the United States’ proclaimed armed conflict against al-Qaeda may be nearing its end. In this way 
they would reinforce the standards implicit his speech and make clear that the United States’ closest 
allies will be watching to see how far he matches his words with action. 
At the same time, the EU and its member states should use their private communications with the 
US administration to press for continued clarification and transparency in US drone strike policies. 
They should ask US officials to explain those aspects of the drone programme that remain uncertain: 
the meaning that the United States attaches to the term “associated forces”, the definition of a 
“continuing and imminent” threat, the basis for deciding what level of threat justifies targeted killing, 
and the criteria and processes by which the United States reviews drone strikes after the fact and 
assesses whether there have been civilian casualties (it is notable that Obama’s speech considered 
various ideas for reviewing proposals for targeted strikes beforehand, but said nothing about post-
strike review). EU officials should encourage the United States to interpret these terms in a strict and 
restrictive way, so that the constraints they embody are made as meaningful as possible. The EU 
should also encourage the US administration to provide more information about individual drone 
strikes in the future, including the threat posed by the target and, as far as possible, an accounting of 
those killed and injured – something that may be more likely if drone strikes are transferred 
progressively from the CIA to the Department of Defence, as officials have suggested will happen. 
Finally, the EU should test the willingness of the United States to rethink its broader armed conflict 
model or declare its proclaimed armed conflict against al-Qaida at an end. The EU might point out that 
if US targeting policies are in fact much more restrictive than allowed for under its legal paradigm, it 
has little to lose from rethinking that paradigm, while it stands to benefit in the future by setting a 
more restrained precedent for other states. 
Looking further ahead, the EU and its member states could build on these exchanges and undertake 
a broader effort with the United States to explore the possibility of agreeing common standards for the 
use of drones and other methods of conducting targeted strikes. It would be enormously valuable if the 
EU and the United States could together agree on a set of guiding principles for the kinds of operation 
that technological change is making possible, rooted in a common interpretation of the applicable parts 
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of international law. (To avoid problems arising from the different obligations that states may face 
under domestic law or regional instruments, such a code of conduct should be based on laws that have 
broad or universal adherence or are recognized as customary.) This would be the most powerful step 
that Europe could take toward establishing a global standard for drone strikes that does not undermine 
the international rule of law, before the evolving practice of other states overtakes any such effort. 
 
